NEWSLETTER

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Search and Attack!

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
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FOREWORD

Conducting a movement to contact using the search-and-attack technique is one of the most complex and difficult missions a brigade or battalion task force conducts. At the JRTC, units typically fight a very small, decentralized, and elusive enemy that knows the terrain better than they do. Units must first conduct very decentralized operations in an effort to locate the enemy, then rapidly mass overwhelming combat power to destroy him. To be successful, units mass combat power in a very short amount of time, integrating and synchronizing vast numbers and types of resources available to destroy the enemy before he breaks contact. The search-and-attack technique is complicated by the fact that little detailed doctrinal guidance, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) exist to help units successfully accomplish this mission.

When conducting a movement to contact using the search-and-attack technique, success often depends on the unit's ability to rapidly develop a simple and flexible plan. The plan should allow the unit to rapidly mass combat power at the decisive point and time in an effort to maintain the initiative. Additionally, this plan must minimize the effects of friction on the battlefield to facilitate the massing of combat power.

Numerous articles have been written addressing some of the common problems units experience while conducting search and attacks. This newsletter focuses primarily at brigade, battalion, and company levels consolidating and presenting applicable TTPs to help alleviate these problems.

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Search and Attack!

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Chapter I
DOCTRINAL REVIEW

The movement to contact (MTC) is an offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact with the enemy. It is conducted when little information about the enemy is available, and the situation must be developed to facilitate future operations. FM 7-30 presents three techniques units can use to execute the MTC. They are the approach-march technique, the reconnaissance-in-force technique, and the search-and-attack technique. Each technique has its own advantages and disadvantages that must be assessed while deciding which technique to employ.

The approach-march technique is best used when the following conditions apply:

- **Enemy force is more conventional in nature.**
- **Enemy force follows a more structured order of battle, and is more predictable in nature.**
- **Enemy force is more centrally located.**
- **Enemy conducts more centralized operations.**

The unit conducting a MTC using the approach-march technique doctrinally organizes its forces into a security force, advanced guard, flank guard, main body, and rear guard. These forces typically move along an axis of advance or direction of attack oriented on a series of march objectives, through areas where contact with the enemy is likely. This process is continued until contact with the enemy is made, and the situation can be further developed to facilitate future operations.

The reconnaissance-in-force technique is similar to the approach-march technique, but is used primarily to gain information about the enemy, locate and test enemy disposition, composition, and reaction. The reconnaissance in force is planned and conducted as an attack, but the objective is more limited in nature. The objective is not necessarily to gain control of a piece of terrain, or to defeat an enemy force, but to force the enemy to react, allowing the unit to determine the size, composition, and location of the enemy force to facilitate future operations. Although the objective is limited, success should be exploited if possible.

The search-and-attack technique is significantly different from the other two techniques and is executed in a different manner. This technique is best used when the following conditions apply:

- **Enemy forces are unconventional in nature.**
- **Enemy typically operates in small teams using "hit-and-run" tactics to gain and maintain the initiative, only making contact when he feels he has the advantage.**
- **Enemy conducts operations over a very large area, and in a very decentralized manner, forcing friendly units to disperse to locate him, and then mass to destroy him.**

Units conduct search and attacks for numerous reasons. According to FM 7-20, page 3-19, units conduct search and attacks to destroy the enemy, facilitate force protection measures, area denial, and information collection. Regardless of the reason, the force conducting the search and attack should be organized into three elements (find, fix, and finish). The size and composition of these elements will vary depending on the factors of METT-T. Although a battalion headquarters can be the controlling headquarters for the search and attack, more appropriately, a brigade headquarters should be the controlling headquarters, with multiple subordinate battalions participating. These subordinate battalions will fulfill one or multiple roles of the **find, fix, and finish** functions.

FM 7-20 presents one technique a battalion task force can use to execute such a mission (see chart on page I-3). This method is initiated by the scout platoon, or a reinforced scout platoon conducting an area or zone reconnaissance ahead of the task force. Serving as part of the find force, the scout platoon attempts to locate and gain information about the enemy, initially in AO blue, then AO red, and eventually AO white. At designated times, or once the enemy force is located, the scout platoon conducts a linkup with the task force at linkup point 1, exchanging information, and,if necessary,guides them into AO Blue. If the scout platoon is successful in locating the enemy, the task force then postures itself to attack. If the enemy has not been located, the task force then occupies the area and continues to search for the enemy. The scout platoon then moves to another area (AO red, then AO white) to continue the reconnaissance effort once again. The process is continued until the enemy force is located and destroyed, or the battalion area of operations is determined to be free of enemy activity. If the area is determined to be free of activity, another area of operations is designated, and the process begins again. These techniques are valid, but additional discussion is required to refine the process and to help focus the effort, resulting in a more integrated and synchronized operation.



FM 7-10 presents a very similar technique to be used at company level. Using this technique, the company commander designates small teams or squads (find element) to reconnoiter a designated zone. Once the find element completes its reconnaissance, either finding the enemy or gaining information about the enemy, the rest of the company then occupies the area and continues the search and attack. The find element then moves to the next designated area and continues the process. The company commander can enhance his ability to mass his combat power by keeping the areas relatively small, minimizing the distance required to move the fixing and finishing force once contact with the enemy is made.

This newsletter addresses the search and attack in three separate phases. The phases are:

- **Phase I, Planning.**
- **Phase II, Setting the Conditions.**
- **Phase III, Execution.✪**

Chapter II
PLANNING

As in most military operations, success begins with the planning process. The plan must be simple and facilitate flexibility during execution, yet provide sufficient detail. The commander and staff must be capable of developing and issuing such a plan in a very short amount of time. The plan must integrate all available assets in finding, fixing and finishing the enemy. Although the search and attack is characterized by decentralized small unit actions, each of those "muscle movements" must be supported by the battalion in some way. Whether it is by positioning the battalion surgeon with an advanced trauma life-saving (ATLS) capability vicinity the main effort, analyzing and disseminating information obtained from satellite imagery, or coordinating attack helicopter support, the battalion/brigade headquarters must integrate and synchronize the operation - and "get every dog in the fight." This chapter will highlight some of the common problems units experience while planning search and attacks, and will also provide TTP to help resolve some of the issues.

"Conventional wisdom indicated that the enemy had drifted into an area southeast of Pleiku, and we were directed to conduct operations there. Shortly after the operation started, Major General Stanley (Swede) Larsen, the Corps Commander, visited us and asked how things were going. I told him we had no contact to speak of and didn't expect any. Whereupon Larsen asked, 'Why are you conducting operations there? My response: 'That's what your order in writing directed us to do.' The general answered that our primary mission was: Find the enemy and go after him." -- Conversation between BG Richard T. Knowles, Assistant Division Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, and MG Stanley Larsen, Corps Commander, regarding operations vicinity of Plei Me, 12 November 1965.[1]

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[1] ***"We Were Soldiers Once. . .And Young,"*** **by LTG Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Mr. Joseph L. Galloway**

Issue: Units typically have problems developing a simple restated mission that clearly identifies the unit's task and purpose (mission=task+purpose) providing a clear and common picture throughout the chain of command.

Discussion: This shortfall often creates confusion within the chain of command, and ultimately leads to an unsynchronized, and poorly integrated execution of the operation. As previously stated, the search and attack is not an operation, only a technique used to conduct the MTC (FM 7-20, p. 3-18). As a result, the operation that is most appropriate is the MTC. The purpose portion of the mission statement should be a very clear, yet simple statement that identifies the "why" of the task.[2]

Typically unit mission statements from battalion to squad level will be ". . .conducts search and attack/MTC operations in assigned areas to locate and destroy the enemy to prevent him from . . . ." This mission statement may be fine for battalion level, but provides insufficient detail for levels below battalion. The mission analysis process must be conducted throughout the entire chain of command. If the term MTC appears in every squad and platoon mission statement throughout the TF, something is probably wrong. Each company, platoon, and squad play a significant role, but each of these subordinate unit missions is probably different. Each subordinate unit mission statement should be aligned with, and reflect one of, the find, fix, and finish functions of the search and attack. The following scenario illustrates this issue. (This example includes D company as part of the unit's task organization.)

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact in AO Blue NLT DTG to locate and destroy the enemy battalion supply point (BSP) to deny the enemy the essential supplies needed to operate in the AO.

TF 1-23 scheme of maneuver: Scout platoon conducts an area reconnaissance vicinity NAI 1 and 2 to locate the BSP*(find element*). TM A (*Fix element*) blocks enemy ingress/egress along infiltration routes 1 and 2 to deny the enemy the ability to move to/from or to reinforce the BSP. TM D clears Route Apple to support movement of TM B, resupply, and casualty evacuation operations. TM C attacks to locate and destroy the enemy's mortars NLT DTG to prevent the enemy from adjusting indirect fires on TM B. TM B, main effort (*finish element*), on order, attacks to destroy the enemy BSP to deny the enemy the essential supplies he needs to operate in the AO. TM SPT conducts resupply and casualty evacuation to ensure sustainment of the main effort.

1st Platoon, A company: 1/A establishes a platoon ambush vicinity grid NE123456 to block enemy movement to/from the BSP to prevent the enemy from hindering TM B's attack. (This is one example of a platoon mission statement to show how the mission statement is constantly tailored throughout the chain of command.)

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[2] COL Lynn Moore, *"Search and Attack,"* (unpublished article), p. 4.

With the above scheme of maneuver, subordinate unit mission statements might read as follows:

Scout Platoon: Scout platoon conducts area reconnaissance vicinity NAI 1 and 2 to locate the enemy BSP to facilitate the destruction of the enemy BSP by TM B.

Team A: Block enemy egress/ingress on infiltration routes 1 and 2 to support complete destruction of all enemy forces.

TM B: (TF Main Effort) On order, attacks to destroy the BSP to deny the enemy the essential supplies he needs to operate in the AO.

TM C: Conducts area reconnaissance to locate enemy forces, and then attacks to destroy the enemy mortars to prevent the enemy from hindering TM B with indirect fires as they attack.

TM D: Clears and maintains Route Apple to ensure unhindered movement along the MSR facilitating sustainment of the main effort.

TM Support: On order, conducts resupply and casualty evacuation operations in effort to sustain combat units.

Subordinate unit mission statements must be tailored to their specific role. Each subordinate unit is not conducting a MTC or search and attack. Instead, they are fulfilling or supporting one or more of the find, fix, or finish roles which contributes to the TF mission of conducting the MTC.

TTP:

✱A detailed mission analysis must be conducted throughout the entire chain of command. Subordinate unit mission statements must be simple, detailed, and specifically describe that unit's mission.

✱Mission statements should be aligned with one of the find, fix, finish, or the sustainment of those functions (clear LOCs, casualty evacuation, resupply operations). For subordinate units, these tasks typically include locating the enemy by conducting area or zone reconnaissance, fixing/blocking the enemy by establishing platoon ambushes or blocking positions, or destroying the enemy by attacking him.

Issue: **During the mission analysis process, the S2 is often the only officer involved in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.**

Discussion: Because the S2 is primarily the only staff officer normally involved in preparing the IPB, the mission analysis process often gets bogged down and causes delays in the planning process. Not only does this issue create delays in the planning process, but also limits the accuracy of the IPB process directly to the experience level and skills of the S2. The S2 should be the resident expert on the IPB process, but this does not make him the only expert on all aspects of the enemy. Who should know more about the employment of enemy air defense systems than an army aviator or an air defense officer? Who should know more about the employment of enemy obstacles than the engineer who is expected to breach them? Each battlefield operating system (BOS) staff representative should know as much, if not more than the S2, about the enemy regarding his area of expertise. The S2 should be responsible for integrating all this information into a consolidated IPB effort. This approach to the IPB process not only helps prevent delays, but also creates a more detailed and accurate picture of the enemy situation.

TTP:

✱Other BOS staff officers must assist the S2 as he prepares and conducts the early stages of the IPB process (terrain analysis and development of enemy situational templates).

✱The XO should ensure that each BOS staff officer does not get so involved applying only their assets that they fail to assist the S2 in the early stages of the IPB process.

✱Clearly identify what each BOS representative is expected to contribute during the IPB process. If necessary, have the S2 prepare and conduct classes for those who require them. Ensure your NCOs attend these classes; they may be the appropriate individual to assist the S2 in developing and refining the IPB process.

✱Once you have identified your procedures, use them, conduct AARs, and adjust as necessary.

✱The S2 should be responsible for integrating the input of all staff officers/NCOs into a coordinated and integrated IPB effort.

The commander identifies decisive points where he can generate superior combat power in relation to the enemy. These points may result from his terrain analysis (locations on the ground which provide an advantage or put the enemy at a disadvantage), from the enemy analysis (an identified enemy weakness that can be exploited), or possibly time analysis (a time when combat potential of the enemy force is degraded). --FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company* (p. 2-19)

Issue: When planning a MTC using the search and attack technique, units typically struggle to identify the decisive point that will focus their effort throughout the operation.

Discussion: The identification of decisive point(s) is the result of a thorough METT-T analysis. Decisive point(s) may be logistic sites, command and control nodes, the enemy's ADA and indirect fire systems. The enemy force itself can be considered a decisive point. Some argue that enemy personnel are the only non-renewable resource, and that destruction of the enemy soldier is the key to long-term success. You may hinder his ability to fight by destroying the targets listed above, but from a long-term perspective, these critical targets will be replaced, or other methods developed to overcome the short-term problem. Food, ammunition, and radios can be replaced - - it is much more difficult to recruit, train, and deploy a replacement soldier. Nonetheless, the above mentioned critical nodes are locations where troops are concentrated, thereby providing a focus for course-of-action development. It may also be argued that events may be decisive points. Consequently, when a unit makes contact with the enemy (whether it is chance contact or a critical node that was not templated), the time and place of the contact becomes the decisive point. As a result, enemy contacts are clearly a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) which may require an immediate decision by the commander.

Regardless of which philosophy you support, the factors of METT-T should drive your decision, and you must select a specific target to help focus your effort to locate the enemy. These targets are nothing more than tools that are available to help you template, find, fix, and finish the enemy. When determining which enemy target to attack, many units immediately select the enemy supply points, command and control nodes, mortars, or SA14 sites. These are all viable targets, but should not be indiscriminately selected. Careful analysis should be conducted to determine enemy and friendly vulnerabilities and capabilities.[3] Attacking the enemy strengths often leads to mission failure and high casualty rates unless overwhelming combat power can be generated and applied.

When analyzing and selecting the decisive point, the first question that must be answered is what are the enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities. Vulnerabilities and capabilities are rather standard in environments where the search and attack technique is used. Enemy ***vulnerabilities*** often include the following:

- **➡Limited ability to rapidly mass overwhelming combat power.**
- **➡Limited night-vision capability.**
- **➡Limited antiarmor systems.**
- **➡Decentralized command and control.**
- **➡Air defense systems rather simple, and generally limited to daytime operations.**
- **➡Limited indirect fire support systems (normally mortars only).**
- **➡Logistical support systems often tied to a supply transfer point system using company and battalion supply points as a means to sustain their force.**

The enemy ***capabilities*** are typically as follows:

- **➡Much more familiar with the terrain than we are.**
- **➡Very proficient in field craft, small-unit tactics, marksmanship, and battle drills.**
- **➡Operates in small teams facilitating rapid movement throughout the area of operation.**

These lists provide valuable information. They provide us a variety of targets to attack, and a list of enemy strengths to avoid. By developing a similar list looking at friendly vulnerabilities and capabilities, we can now begin to match our capabilities against the enemy vulnerabilities making maximum use of our limited resources.[4] This is the first step to success on the battlefield. Obviously we cannot focus on all of the enemy vulnerabilities. Nor can we afford to focus all of our resources against a single target such as an enemy resupply point. The enemy resupply point may or may not be in our sector. If it is not, we may spend an inordinate amount of resources looking for something we may never find. Based on the initial information available, we must select the one or two most likely and decisive targets (high payoff targets/HPT) in our area and focus our effort, energy, and resources against those selected HPTs. As the operation continues, and more information is collected, or we achieve the desired effects against initially selected targets, we may be able to refocus our efforts against subsequent targets.

Once the commander decides which targets to focus on, the S2 must then begin to develop a target description (situational template) in as much detail as possible. Little doctrinal information about the enemy is available to the S2 to assist in developing these enemy SITTEMPs. As a result, the S2 must rely on his own experience, the experience of his unit, patrol debriefs, or information from the local populace to assist him in developing these SITTEMPs. Over a period of time, the S2 can begin to identify patterns and enemy TTP associated with each target that will assist him as he develops these templates. These target descriptions must include specific and focused PIR that will facilitate locating the target, likely areas where we can begin our search effort, and what the actual target may look like. These situational templates then begin to focus the entire planning process by assisting in determining the unit task organization, reconnaissance and surveillance plan, scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and other key portions of the plan.

TTP:

✱First analyze the enemy and friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities. Match your capabilities to the enemy vulnerabilities to optimize the use of available resources.

✱Based on the current METT-T assessment, select enemy targets that are likely to be in your area of operations that will produce the most decisive result once destroyed.

✱Brigades are normally resourced to focus on no more than five specific enemy targets, and battalions on no more than two enemy targets. Focusing on any more will generally hinder your ability to mass the necessary combat power as you conduct the search and attack. This may sound like too few targets, but more than likely your efforts will identify additional targets you did not originally anticipate.

✱The S2 must have established battle-tracking procedures to facilitate patrol debriefs in an effort to update his doctrinal and situational templates. The accuracy of these templates is critical to the success of the search and attack.

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[3] **COL Lynn Moore, *"Search and Attack,"* (unpublished article), p. 5-7.**

[4] **Ibid., p. 8.**

Issue: As the staff completes the mission analysis and the commander issues his guidance, units often fail to incorporate the S2's situational template into the COA development process.

Discussion: During the mission analysis process, the S2 should have analyzed the enemy vulnerabilities, identified, and recommended to the commander those enemy high value targets (HVTs) that will help focus the unit's search and attack. Through detailed analysis, the commander then decides which HVTs he wants to use to focus his unit's efforts. These targets then become high pay off targets (HPTs). Once these targets are identified and approved by the commander, they become the focal point for the staff as they begin to develop the COAs.

The commander and staff should now begin to develop the COAs using the same process as outlined in FM 101-5 (Final Draft, Aug 96). They should keep in mind the primary functions of find, fix, and finish as they develop the COAs. The commander and staff should use the backward planning technique as they develop the COAs. The finish function is the most critical function of the search and attack. This function is what actually engages and destroys the enemy forces. The commander and staff should first determine what resources will be required to meet the desired endstate once the enemy has been located. The finish force must be responsive, otherwise the enemy will rapidly attrit your forces, or will immediately break contact before you can deliver the decisive blow. Procedures must be in place to facilitate quick movement of the finishing force. These procedures include, but are not limited to, good graphic control measures, responsive means of transportation if required, and effective communications with the force in contact. The commander must be an active participant during the entire planning process. If the commander is actively involved, especially during the COA development and analysis process, he can make on-the-spot decisions and provide immediate guidance that can potentially save significant amounts of time and prevent unnecessary confusion within the staff. For a detailed discussion regarding this issue see **CALL Newsletter 95-12, Dec 95,** ***Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***

The next step is to determine how the enemy will be fixed. The purpose of the fix function is to prevent the enemy from moving his forces to or from a specific location until he can be engaged and destroyed. This is perhaps the most difficult task. Once the enemy is found, if he is not fixed immediately, he will break contact and fade into the woodline before you can destroy him. Ideally, the fix force would be in position prior to initiating the search and attack. These initial fixing positions should be determined based on the enemy SITTEMPs. More appropriately, the fix force would be pre-positioned in areas where they could most likely support the finish element. If contact is made in other areas, then the fixing element must have procedures in place to facilitate moving to where it can influence the fight. These procedures require the use of good graphic control measures and good communications to facilitate this movement. This movement often requires significant amounts of time, allowing the enemy the opportunity to escape. To help alleviate this problem, we must identify other resources that can be more responsive and help bridge the gap until the ground maneuver fixing force can arrive. These resources may include the use of attack aviation, artillery, mortars, armored or mechanized forces, or ideally a combination of any of the above resources.

Then the next step is to develop the search portion of the COA. Due to the illusive and unpredictable nature of the enemy, you will have a difficult time finding him. The assets committed to the find function should obviously focus on locating the selected high payoff target. Every member of the task force should play a role in the find function. These actions range from area reconnaissance patrols being conducted by the TF scout platoon, to the 5-ton truck driver from the Forward Support Battalion keeping his eyes open for any peculiar activity along the MSR during his supply runs. All efforts of this function should be driven by the CCIR and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and should strive to answer those critical questions identified by the commander. Don't forget to include resources such as counterintelligence, civil affairs, and military police into the find function as well.

Complete the COA by determining how you will logistically support your COA. This not only includes resupply operations and casualty evacuation operations, but also how you will facilitate the movement of both your logistic support elements, as well as the movement of any mounted elements such as your finishing force. If you can not realistically support your newly developed COA, you may have to make some necessary modifications.

You now have objectively determined the amount of resources required for each of the find, fix, finish, and support functions. Regardless of what type of COA you develop, your COA should be based around the doctrinal functions of find, fix, finish, as well as the support function. Every resource available to your task force should be focused toward either conducting or supporting one of these functions.

TTP:

✱The commander must be actively involved in the entire planning process. Through active participation, the commander can make on-the-spot decisions and provide immediate guidance to the staff as necessary.

✱The S2's enemy SITTEMPs must be used as you develop your COAs.

✱Use the backward planning process to develop your COA.

☛First determine what is required to destroy or finish the enemy contact.

☛Next determine what resources are required to fix the enemy.

☛Then determine what resources are needed to find the enemy, as well as to logistically support your COA.

✱If resources are not available to support your COA, consider the following:

☛Request additional resources. Keep a list of possible assets available and their capabilities for future use.

☛Request to reduce the size of your area of responsibility, or assign zones of action within your area of operations to help focus your effort.

☛Determine how units can fulfill multiple roles; for example, can the find force assume part of the fix force responsibility.

☛Develop a COA that can be accomplished with the available resources.

"One more thing, Hal. In that area be sure your companies are close enough for mutual support." -- Conversation between COL Thomas W. Brown, Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and LTC Harold G. Moore, Commander, 1/7 Cavalry, regarding operations vicinity Ia Drang Valley, 13 November 1965.[5]

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[5] ***"We Were Soldiers Once. . .And Young,"*** **by LTG Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Mr. Joseph L. Galloway**

Issue: Units have problems developing schemes of maneuver that are fully integrated and synchronized.

Discussion: There are numerous techniques available to assist units as they develop COAs. This section will discuss some of the most common approaches. The first approach is the **Decisive Point Technique.** As with all COAs, this technique centers around the S2's enemy SITTEMPs. This technique is best used when the S2 has received some indication that a specific enemy target is in his area of operations. If no specific enemy indicators are present, then he must rely on his own collection plan and pattern analysis to generate this information, ultimately resulting in the development or refinement of an enemy SITTEMP. These indicators may result from an EW intercept, mine incident, Q36 radar acquisition, or some other type of report. The S2 then analyzes this information and develops or refines his enemy SITTEMP. At this point, it is unknown exactly where the enemy is located, but based on the available information, some general indication of where and what the enemy is doing is available. This information drives the COA development process, and is planned similarly to a deliberate attack.[6] For this example we have received information indicating an enemy mortar site is operating in our area, and the commander designates this target as the decisive point. The following task organization, mission statement, scheme of maneuver, and COA sketch are presented to help explain the technique:

TASK ORGANIZATION

TM A	*CO B*	*CO C*	*TF CONTROL*
1 PLT	1 PLT	1 PLT	TF MAIN CP
2 PLT	2 PLT	2 PLT	MORT PLT
3 PLT	3 PLT	MORT SECT	SCT PLT
3/C	MORT SECT	ENG SQ	AT PLT
MORT SECT	AD SECT	AD SECT	ENG PLT (-)
ENG SQ			ADA PLT (-)
AD Sect			CBT TNS
			FLD TNS
			SCT WPN TM (OPCON)

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact 010600 Dec 99 to destroy suspected enemy mortar site vicinity grid AB123456 to prevent the enemy from effectively adjusting indirect fire against our forces.

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[6] **CPT Kevin J. Dougherty and CPT Richard C. Townes, "Search and Attack,"** ***Infantry,*** **November-December 1994, p. 42.**

TF 1-23 scheme of maneuver: TF scout platoon**(*find element*)** conducts an area reconnaissance vicinity objective to confirm/deny enemy mortar site location. Co. B **(*fix element)** blocks enemy movement along routes 1 and 2 to prevent the enemy from escaping or reinforcing the objective area. Team A, main effort **(*finish element*)** attacks to destroy enemy mortar site to prevent indirect fires from hindering the TF effort. Co. C follows and supports Team A. On order, scout weapons team occupies attack by fire position to assist in the destruction of the enemy mortar site.



COA Sketch:

The next technique is the***Linear Technique.*** Once again, this technique is best used when there are strong indications that the enemy is operating in a specific area. It is also best used when there are natural linear type boundaries (roads, power lines, or creekbeds) present to assist in command and control, and the area to be searched is rather large[7]. This technique can be used at either company or battalion level or both.

[7] **Ibid., p. 43.**

For this example, we have received reports that the enemy has emplaced several point minefields along a road in the TF area of operations. We assume that the enemy is still operating in the area and is probably maintaining surveillance of the minefields. Through pattern analysis we also suspect that there may be some enemy activity vicinity the low ground in the western portion of the TF sector. The following task organization, mission statement, scheme of maneuver, and COA sketch are presented to help explain the technique:

TASK ORGANIZATION

CO A	*TM B*	*CO C*	*TF CONTROL*
1 PLT	1 PLT	1 PLT	TF MAIN CP
2 PLT	2 PLT	2 PLT	SCT PLT
3 PLT	3 PLT	MORT SECT	MORT PLT
MORT SECT	3/C	ADA SECT	AT PLT
ENG SQ	MORT SECT		ENG PLT (-)
	ENG SQ		ADA PLT (-)
	AD SECT		MECH PLT (OPCON)
			SCT WPN TM (OPCON)
			CBT TNS
			FLD TNS

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact on 010600 Dec 99 to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR.

TF scheme of maneuver: The task force scout platoonconducts a zone reconnaissance to locate the enemy to facilitate its destruction. Tm B, main effort, conducts movement to contact to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR. Co. A conducts movement to contact to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR. Co. C will follow and support TM B. Mechanized platoon conducts mounted patrols along route in TM B's sector, and, on order, attacks to destroy enemy. Scout weapons team conducts a zone reconnaissance in sector forward of the task force in an effort to locate the enemy, and, on order, occupies attack by fire position to assist in the destruction of the enemy.

COA Sketch:



The two previous techniques rely on indications that the enemy is operating in a specific area. The third technique focuses on a situation where there is little, if any, specific information available about the enemy. During this situation you must first aggressively seek to determine where the enemy is located. This technique is called the ***Independent Squads Technique*** and is highlighted by decentralized squad-size patrols. This technique is also one of the most common, and least desirable techniques. Typically the battalion will be given an area of operations. Using this technique, the battalion subdivides its area into multiple company-sized area of operations. This process continues until eventually each company has several squad-size patrols conducting decentralized operations throughout the battalion AO.[8] This technique focuses on the find function of the search and attack methodology, and makes it extremely difficult to fix, and subsequently finish the enemy once contact is made. This technique is often only successful if you first locate the enemy without being detected yourself, providing you have time to mass your combat power in an effort to fix and eventually finish the enemy. Most often, the enemy locates you first, and you are now fighting against one of the enemy strengths (squad-on-squad operations).

[8] **Ibid., p. 42.**

When operating with numerous squad-size independent patrols throughout an area, it is very difficult to integrate and synchronize the support necessary to ensure success. It is difficult to accomplish the following:

Mass combat power once contact is made.
Maintain consistent communications with all subordinate elements.
Provide reliable and timely logistical support, especially casualty evacuation.

This technique has many variations. Two of the more common are:

(1) Company splits area of operations into two platoon zones of action where platoons then conduct the search and attack. The third platoon establishes ambushes along likely lines of drift. The two platoons who are aggressively seeking the enemy attempt to flush the enemy toward the ambushes.

(2) Once again the company establishes two platoon zones of actions where these platoons conduct the search and attack. The third platoon serves as a reserve, centrally locating itself in a place where it can move to and support the other two platoons once contact is made.

TTP:

✱At battalion or brigade level, multiple techniques may be used simultaneously. Assess the factors of METT-T and select the technique or techniques that best support your situation.

✱If you have sufficient information that confirms your enemy SITTEMPs, or you receive other reports that confirm enemy activity in a specific area, use either the decisive point or the linear technique.

✱The S2 should develop daily (24-hour) enemy activity overlays. These overlays should graphically summarize enemy activities during a specific 24-hour time period. During a two- to three-day time period, these overlays will assist the S2 in identifying enemy patterns of activity, and will help the unit anticipate future enemy actions.

✱If you must use the independent squads technique, ensure you consider the following:

☛Limit the size of your area. This helps create mutual support between your subordinate elements.

☛Use sufficient graphic control measures to include phase lines, boundaries, checkpoints, linkup points, no fire areas, and attack by fire positions.

☛Ensure you develop a realistic communications plan to facilitate reliable command and control throughout your AO.

☛Thoroughly wargame how you will logistically support your COAs, specifically addressing resupply and casualty evacuation operations.

Issue: Task organizations do not always include all supporting efforts required to ensure a fully synchronized search and attack.

Discussion: Units do not consider additional assets in the task organization to augment and support the find, fix and finish forces. A battalion task force requires the synchronization of all assets to support the operation. Once a main effort is identified, it must be freed of all restraints and allowed to focus on its specific mission. These restraints include: maintaining open lines of communications (LOCs) to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation, responsive logistical support, the burden of civilians and villages in the area, and other sources of friction which may divert the main effort's focus from either locating or destroying the enemy.

TTP: **The following represents possible additions to a battalion task organization. Because of the requirements for numerous .50-caliber machine guns and MK 19s for the additional forces, the following task organization is best suited for Airborne and Air Assault units with organic Delta companies. However, varied forms of this concept may be used by standard light infantry units. If armor assets are available, they may be incorporated into any or all of the teams.**

TM LOC: **The purpose of TM LOC would be to clear and maintain open and unhindered lines of communications to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation for the main effort. For Airborne or Air Assault units, this organization could be commanded by the Delta company commander. Its task organization may include two Delta platoons equipped with a mix of .50 cals and MK 19s, two engineer squads, a Stinger team, and possibly a rifle squad or platoon. For light infantry units, the team may consist of a TOW section, the engineer platoon minus, and a mounted rifle platoon. If tanks with mine plows or rollers are available, they should be incorporated into TM LOC. Opening LOCs is not a one-time effort. It requires constant attention and resources to ensure continued freedom of movement.**

TM Village: **The purpose of TM Village includes the following:**

- **Monitor and assess the impact of events and activities in vicinity of populated areas.**
- **Serve as a means of communications with the local populace.**
- **Attempt to identify potential problems within populated areas that may hinder the TF effort.**
- **Attempt to develop and sustain a positive relationship with the local populace.**
- **Establish and maintain HUMINT sources to facilitate unhindered operations in and around populated areas.**
- **If possible, establish a formal means to communicate with leaders of villages, host nation police, or governmental authorities (i.e., land line or local telephone network).**

This element could be task-organized under the direction of the S5 or Civil Affairs officer. The task organization may include a tactical PSYOP team, Counter-Intelligence (CI) team, medics with an FLA, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) team, and possibly a chaplain. A rifle platoon or an MP platoon may be task-organized with this element for security.

TM Support: **The purpose of TM Support would be to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation for the main effort. TM Support requires close coordination and support from TM LOC. This element could be task-organized under the direction of the S4 or HHC commander, with a support platoon vehicle, a TOW section for security, the Physician Assistant or surgeon with an advanced trauma lifesaving system (ATLS), medics, and FLA.✪**

Chapter III
SETTING THE CONDITIONS

This chapter focuses on the events that occur from the point the order is issued to the point initial contact with the enemy is made. During this time conditions are set or fail to be set to facilitate the desired outcome when contact with the enemy is made.

Issue: Units do not have established procedures to facilitate conducting a continuous assessment of the current situation that results in timely modifications to the existing plan and contributes to maintaining the initiative.

Discussion: Units typically develop a detailed plan to initiate the search and attack. This initial planning process generally follows the doctrinal Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and most commonly uses the abbreviated decision-making process. This initial plan outlines the basic concepts and procedures used to locate the enemy, and then how to destroy the enemy. You should continue to use the initial plan until sufficient information becomes available that causes you to adjust your plan. The current plan and situation must be constantly evaluated and adjusted as the tactical situation develops, and more information becomes available. These future planning sessions should evaluate the current situation, and determine where and how future operations are to be conducted. These future planning sessions may more closely resemble a targeting/synchronization meeting using the abbreviated decision-making process as opposed to the formal MDMP. These planning sessions should include representatives from all staff sections, and should be as formal as time allows. At battalion level, these planning sessions should be focused on the next 12 to 24 hours. At brigade level, these planning sessions should be focused on the next 24 to 36 hours. These sessions may result in only slight modifications to the existing plan, or may create significant changes to the plan in terms of task organization, area of operations, and methods of search. If major changes are required involving large-scale air assaults or other similar type operations, more time may be necessary to plan. Regardless of what modifications are required, your goal should be to produce and issue any orders or FRAGOs early enough to facilitate troop-leading procedures by subordinate units. (See table on the next page for an example timeline.)

	D-2	D-1	D	D+1	D+2	D+3
BDE/PLAN	ISSUE ORDER	ISSUE FRAG 1	ISSUE FRAG 2	ISSUE FRAG 3	ISSUE FRAG 4	ISSUE FRAG 5
EXECUTE			ORDER	FRAG 1	FRAG 2	FRAG 3
BN/PLAN	ORDER RECEIPT /PLAN	ISSUE ORDER	ISSUE FRAG 1	ISSUE FRAG 2	ISSUE FRAG 3	ISSUE FRAG 4
EXECUTE			ORDER	FRAG 1	FRAG 2	FRAG 3

TTP:

✱Do not become so focused on the current fight that you fail to analyze the bigger picture. Continue to analyze the enemy situation to anticipate what he is going to do in the future. Use the targeting meeting process to determine how you can influence future operations.

✱The planning process is not a one-time effort. The situation must be constantly evaluated and assessed to determine if modifications to the existing plan are required.

✱Proposed composition of the planning team includes the following: Cdr, XO, S2, S3, S3 Air, FSO, ALO, TF Engineer, TF Air Defense Officer, S1, S4, Chemical officer, and Signal officer, and, if applicable: brigade targeting officer, ANGLICO, heavy TM LO, SOCCE, MP platoon leader, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, MI Company Commander, and aviation representative.

✱Develop an agenda to conduct these daily situation updates and future planning sessions. As an example, see Appendix A.

✱Develop, establish, and maintain a good routine or battle rhythm that facilitates timely, efficient, and effective situation updates and planning sessions. As an example, see Appendix B.

Issue: Units do not effectively use hours of limited visibility to their advantage while conducting search and attacks.

Discussion: Many units attempt to execute all three functions (find, fix, and finish) of the search and attack during hours of limited visibility. This approach often turns out to be unproductive and normally detracts from the unit's ability to successfully accomplish its long-term mission of destroying the enemy. Typically, if contact is made with the enemy during hours of darkness, it is often on the enemy's terms and results in numerous friendly casualties. The JRTC OPFOR most often operates in small three- to five-man teams that move much more quietly at night than rotational unit squads or platoons. OPFOR three- to five-man enemy teams normally detect BLUFOR squads or platoons as they patrol to find the enemy, thus setting favorable conditions for the enemy.

The crux of this issue centers around the find function. Infantry squads and platoons have a difficult time finding the enemy during hours of daylight. This is particularly true when attempting to locate supply points which are usually well camouflaged and buried underground. Attempting to locate (find) the same type of targets during hours of darkness is much more difficult, if not impossible. Squads and platoons are generally only equipped with AN/PVS-4s and AN/PVS-7s to aid them in actually detecting the enemy. Both systems are limited in their capabilities when fighting a well-disciplined enemy. Most light infantry units do not yet possess any small, lightweight, hand-held thermal night-vision capability that truly gives them the necessary advantage as they attempt to locate the enemy at night. However, if squads detect the enemy before the enemy detects the squads, they generally have the necessary tools at squad and platoon levels (AN/PAQ4A/B/C, and AN/PVS-7) to appropriately react to the contact.

TTP:

✱This discussion is not advocating that infantry soldiers do nothing during hours of darkness. There are many activities that can be accomplished during hours of darkness that might facilitate more effective search and attacks. One option is to use hours of darkness to set the conditions for the next day's activities. Setting the conditions may include the following activities:

☛Conducting dismounted movement, truck movement, or air assaults into other areas of operation.

☛Infiltrating the fixing force by establishing ambushes or blocking positions along likely enemy lines of drift.

☛Conducting route clearance operations to facilitate unhindered movement along designated MSRs.

☛Conducting area reconnaissance missions on specific point NAIs.

☛Conducting resupply operations.

✱Carefully and realistically assess and determine the capabilities and state of training of your unit's night-fighting skills. Once you make this determination, then decide what you expect to occur during hours of darkness.

Issue: Establishing a good battle rhythm is critical to success when conducting search and attacks.

Discussion: The term "battle rhythm" describes those events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis that facilitates setting the conditions for success. These events include the following:

- ☛**Battle update briefs**
- ☛**Commander conference calls**
- ☛**Targeting meetings**
- ☛**Receipt/submission of reports**
- ☛**Shift-change briefs**
- ☛**Staff huddles**
- ☛**Publishing of orders and FRAGOs**
- ☛**LOGPACs**

Establishing a battle rhythm assists the unit in developing a synchronized routine that facilitates continuous operations and maintains the initiative. During conventional operations, activity levels generally surge and subside in a much more predictable fashion, with transition periods intermixed throughout providing units time to recover, refit, and rest. Unconventional type operations generally occur over a much longer timeframe with more consistent activity levels. Success on the unconventional battlefield requires long-term commitment, tactical patience, and a well-established battle rhythm. The lack of a functioning battle rhythm creates a ripple effect throughout the entire chain of command and results in reactive versus proactive operations.

When establishing a battle rhythm, you must first determine when, during the course of a 24-hour timeframe, you intend to most aggressively pursue the enemy. Do you intend to focus your resources primarily during hours of limited visibility, during hours of daylight, or during a combination of the two? To answer this question, you must conduct a detailed analysis of all factors of METT-T (see previous issue and discussion). Your entire unit cannot conduct sustained operations 24 hours a day for much more than about 72 hours without experiencing significant degradation. Successful search and attacks require a long-term commitment, and generally cannot be won with a single decisive blow to the enemy. They require successful operations on a day-to-day basis for extended periods of time.

Once you determine when you intend to focus the majority of your resources, you must then backward plan from the time of execution to the time of mission receipt. Your mission receipt time then becomes the orders issue time for your higher headquarters. Your battle rhythm must be synchronized with your higher headquarters. All required activities must be focused on supporting the execution time. You will not always be able to maintain this detailed battle rhythm. Periodically, deviations from your battle rhythm will be necessary. There is a fine line between enforcing your battle rhythm in an effort to maintain the initiative, and becoming so inflexible that you ignore targets of opportunity as they present themselves on the battlefield. You cannot become so fixed to your battle rhythm that you fail to exploit opportunities as they occur. Conversely, you cannot jump from one event to another and become so reactive that you accomplish nothing.

TTP:

✱Identify those events and activities that occur on a recurring basis.

✱Decide what timeframe during the course of a 24-hour time period will be your main effort. Backward plan your timeline from there. Whatever timeframe you decide to be your main effort, ensure you use the remaining time to set the conditions for your main effort. Setting conditions could include emplacing your fixing force, moving from your current area of operations to another, conducting resupply, troop-leading procedures, or resting. Use this time to conduct anything necessary to prepare you for the search and attack. This will allow you to concentrate on nothing but searching for and attacking the enemy during your selected timeframe.

✱Ensure you review your battle rhythm with your higher headquarters. Your battle rhythm must support your higher headquarters.

Issue: The role of the scout platoon in the search and attack is often undefined, and, if not well thought out, results in wasted resources.

Discussion: The scout platoon is a very critical resource, and is the only organic reconnaissance element available to the battalion task force. Typical problems associated with employing the scout platoon are as follows:

➤The scout platoon often gets over tasked to conduct far more missions than they are capable of conducting (area/zone reconnaissance, linkup and guide missions, observe numerous NAIs, and call for and control indirect fires). These missions are all within the capabilities of scout platoons, but any scout platoon would have problems conducting all of them at once unless they received additional resources to conduct them.

➤Battalion headquarter's inability to maintain reliable and consistent communications with the platoon.

➤Scout platoons normally operate in locations where mutual support from rifle companies can not be provided if contact with the enemy is made.

➤Difficulty providing logistical support to scout teams spread throughout a large area of operations.

➤Difficulty evacuating casualties.

These problems often prevent units from successfully employing their scout platoon. There are no easy answers to any of these issues. Each of the above issues must be carefully considered with realistic courses of actions developed to address each of them.

The root of the issue focuses on the scout platoon's assigned mission. This issue is so critical that, if not properly addressed, will create numerous other problems that will hinder mission success. Typically, the platoon is tasked to conduct either a zone reconnaissance over a very large area, or multiple area reconnaissance missions in an effort to locate the enemy. The scout platoon then splits up into three- to four-man teams, each patrolling an area so large that it cannot be thoroughly searched in the time provided. Either the scouts fail to locate the enemy, or the scout sections locate the enemy on unfavorable terms that result in numerous friendly casualties. These casualties must then be evacuated, which completely absorbs the attention and resources of the unit, detracting from their primary mission of destroying the enemy.

The answers to these complex issues lies in what tasks you assign the scout platoon. When tasking your scouts to conduct a mission, ensure that you can provide them the necessary resources to prepare them for success. If you cannot support them with the resources required to accomplish their assigned mission, do not task them to conduct the mission. Also, consider that if the scout platoon makes contact with the enemy, the results are likely to be unfavorable. You will want to establish and maintain contact with the enemy with a force that is resourced and capable of appropriately handling the contact. This force may or may not be the scout platoon.

Also, do not feel compelled to use your scout platoon just because you have one. There may be times where you need to consolidate the platoon to provide them the opportunity to refit and plan for future operations.

TTP:

✱Avoid overtasking your scout platoon. Carefully and realistically determine what your scout platoon is capable of accomplishing and assign their mission accordingly.

✱Based on the assigned mission, adequately resource your scout platoon to accomplish the mission.

✱Conduct a detailed risk assessment for your scout platoon. This risk assessment must realistically address the risk you are willing to accept or not accept as the platoon conducts its mission. If your scout platoon makes contact with the enemy, the results are most often unfavorable, and will require significant resources to properly handle the situation.

✱Select one or two critical NAIs to let your scout platoon focus on. This will allow them to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the assigned area.

✱Do not feel it is necessary to use the scout platoon for conventional-type scout missions if the situation does not provide such an opportunity. The scout platoon can serve as a TF reserve (if given mobility assets) or convoy escort security. *Just realize that this is the only organic reconnaissance asset you have, and that it must be carefully managed as such.*

✱Rifle companies can also be tasked to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to allow the scout platoon to focus its efforts with its limited resources.

Issue: Reconnaissance assets (scout platoons, long-range surveillance teams, etc.) are not deployed early enough to facilitate having an impact on the planning process and subsequent operations.

Discussion: Late deployment of reconnaissance assets creates numerous problems. First, if these assets are to accomplish their mission when deployed late, they must often move rapidly, and sometimes during hours of daylight. Moving under these conditions significantly increases the chance of contact with the enemy. This contact often leads to casualties and loss of valuable reconnaissance assets that cannot be easily evacuated and replaced. Second, the information that is collected is often collected late and fails to influence the planning process in a timely manner. To prevent these problems, the commander must make a conscious effort to prepare and deploy the reconnaissance assets as early as possible. To facilitate this, the process should begin by the commander issuing detailed guidance specifically addressing the reconnaissance effort. This guidance should include: PIR, methods of insertion, resources to support the reconnaissance effort, levels of acceptable risk, and extraction considerations. The next step is for the staff to refine the commander's guidance and develop an initial reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. Staff members who should be intimately involved are: the S2/S2 NCOIC, S3, Fire Support Officer, Scout Platoon Leader, Signal Officer, S4, and Air Liaison Officer. This reconnaissance planning cell should rapidly develop a plan to support the deploying team. This initial R&S planning session should occur early during the MDMP or targeting process; either after the commander's guidance, or after COA development. The initial plan will form the foundation of the R&S plan and must be constantly updated as the staff continues the decision-making process.

TTP:

✱The commander must provide detailed and specific R&S planning guidance. The guidance must address the following:

- **☛PIR**
- **☛Insertions techniques**
- **☛Acceptable levels of risk**
- **☛Assets involved**
- **☛Areas to focus the reconnaissance effort**
- **☛The reconnaissance objective**
- **☛Extraction considerations**

✱The R&S planning session must include representatives from all BOSs. It must be a combined arms plan.

✱This planning team should provide the scout platoon the following:

- **☛The most current enemy SITTEMP**
- **☛TF mission statement**
- **☛Tentative TF commander's intent**
- **☛Tentative TF scheme of maneuver**
- **☛Mission statement for the scout platoon (task and purpose)**
- **☛Initial NAIs, PIR, SIR**
- **☛Fire support plan**
- **☛Casualty evacuation plan**
- **☛Transportation plan, if required**
- **☛Resupply plan**
- **☛Communications plan✪**

Chapter IV
EXECUTION

"Your infantry on my infantry, I'm going to win. Your artillery on my infantry, I'm going to run. Your helicopters on my infantry, I'm going to hide. But any two of those combined, or even worse, all three combined on my infantry, I'll lose every time."

-- Comment made by the former JRTC OPFOR commander, LTC Sittnick.

Ultimately, the purpose of the search and attack is to destroy the enemy. Once you find the enemy, you must rapidly fix, and subsequently mass your combat power to facilitate its destruction. Massing your combat power must incorporate a combined arms approach, including all battlefield operating systems. This chapter focuses on those issues that directly relate or contribute to finishing the enemy.

Issue: Few battalion and brigade battle staffs have practiced battle drills enough to facilitate the rapid action necessary once contact with the enemy is made.

Discussion: As events occur on the battlefield, staffs must possess the capability to rapidly assess the situation, develop viable courses of action, and generate the orders and instructions necessary to implement those decisions. Well-developed and -rehearsed staff battle drills can help reduce the time required to appropriately handle certain types of events. Not all events can be adequately addressed by a simple staff battle drill. More complex events may require the use of the MDMP to solve. However, there are numerous events or activities that can and should be solved by a simple staff battle drill. Battle drills should be developed to handle those events which require immediate decisions and actions but do not require the detailed planning inherent in the MDMP. Examples of these types of events that occur while conducting a search and attack include:

- **Reacting to contact with the enemy**
- **Clearance of fires**
- **Capturing of an enemy prisoner of war**
- **Mine incident**
- **Casualty evacuation**
- **Reacting to enemy surface-to-air missile launch**
- **Reacting to enemy indirect fires**
- **Identification of enemy cache**
- **Civil disturbance/village incident**
- **Enemy threat in rear area**

This list is not all inclusive, but does provide a fundamental list of events that should be handled by nothing more that a staff battle drill. In the search and attack environment, once contact with the enemy is made, you do not have long to rapidly fix and finish the enemy before he breaks contact. Battle drills are a tool that can help reduce the time required to solve these common problems.

TTP:

✱Identify those events or activities that happen on a recurring basis. Once identified, develop a staff battle drill that adequately addresses each event.

✱Ensure all personnel who work in your TOC are familiar with, and understand, their roles and responsibilities during the execution of the battle drill.

✱Once developed, rehearse these drills as often as possible.

✱Conduct AARs to assess your proficiency, as well as the need to adjust or fine-tune your battle drills.

(See next page for example staff battle drills.)

DRILL/ SECTION	REACT TO ENEMY MINE INCIDENT	REACT TO ENEMY CONTACT
TF S2	- PLOT LOCATION - UPDATE/ADJUST SITTEMPs AS NECESSARY - CONDUCT PATTERN ANALYSIS - PASS INFORMATION HORIZONTALLY & VERTICALLY AS NECESSARY - ASSESS NEED TO CONDUCT A DEBRIEF WITH INVOLVED UNITS - GET ENEMY BDA, UPDATE ENEMY STRENGTHS - COORD EPW SUPPORT (IPW/CI)	- PLOT LOCATIONS - UPDATE/ADJUST SITTEMPs AS NECESSARY - CONDUCT PATTERN ANALYSIS - PASS INFORMATION HORIZONTALLY & VERTICALLY AS NECESSARY - ASSESS NEED TO CONDUCT A DEBRIEF WITH INVOLVED UNITS - GET ENEMY BDA, UPDATE ENEMY STRENGTHS - COORD EPW SUPPORT (IPW/CI)
TF S3	- RECEIVE/PLOT SALUTE REPORT; CLARIFY AS NECESSARY - DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN TOC - REPORT INCIDENT HORIZONTALLY AND VERTICALLY IMMEDIATELY - INFORM CDR/XO/S3 - CONFIRM LOCATION OF SUBORD & SUPPORTING UNITS' VICINITY CONTACT INCLUDING UNITS CURRENTLY MOVING ON ROUTE - COORD ROUTE CLEARANCE EFFORT: ENG, FIRE SPT, SECURITY - ASSESS NEED TO SEARCH AREA FOR ADDITIONAL ENEMY ACTIVITY: MINE, CACHES, ENEMY OP - OBTAIN BDA, UPDATE UNIT COMBAT POWER STATUS - ALERT MEDICAL ASSETS OF POSSIBLE CASEVAC - CONFIRM/ADJUST FLIGHT ROUTE AS NECESSARY FOR AIR MEDEVAC - CLEAR AIRSPACE AS REQUIRED FOR AIR MEDEVAC - COORD TO ISOLATE AREA; DETERMINE ALTERNATE ROUTES - ASSESS NEED TO UPGRADE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES	- RECEIVE/PLOT SALUTE REPORT; CLARIFY AS NECESSARY - DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN TOC - REPORT INCIDENT HORIZONTALLY AND VERTICALLY IMMEDIATELY - INFORM CDR/XO/S3 - CONFIRM LOCATION OF SUBORD & SUPPORTING UNITS' VICINITY CONTACT - ASSESS NEED TO COMMIT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO HANDLE CONTACT: QRF, RESERVE, AVIATION, CAS, FIRE SPT - OBTAIN BDA; UPDATE UNIT COMBAT POWER STATUS - ALERT MEDICAL ASSETS OF POSSIBLE CASEVAC - CONFIRM/ADJUST FLIGHT ROUTE AS NECESSARY FOR AIR MEDEVAC - CLEAR AIRSPACE AS REQUIRED FOR AIR MEDEVAC - REPORT INCIDENT TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS - ASSESS NEED TO UPGRADE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES
TF FSE	- ASSESS NEED TO EMPLACE CFZ TO COVER INCIDENT - ASSESS NEED TO ADJUST FIRE SUPPORT PLAN, BASED ON ADJUSTED MANEUVER PLAN - DETERMINE IF CONTACT IS IN VICINITY OF EXITING TARGET - ADJUST PRIORITY OF FIRES AND TARGETS AS NECESSARY - INFORM SUBORDINATE FSO/FO THAT APPROPRIATE TARGET IS IN EFFECT - ASSESS WHICH FIRE SUPPORT ASSET WILL SHOOT MISSION IF REQUESTED (81MM/105MM/155MM/NGF); SEND WARNING ORDER	- ASSESS NEED TO EMPLACE CFZ TO COVER INCIDENT - ASSESS NEED TO ADJUST FIRE SUPPORT PLAN, BASED ON ADJUSTED MANEUVER PLAN - DETERMINE IF CONTACT IS IN VICINITY OF EXISTING TARGET - ADJUST PRIORITY OF FIRES AND TARGETS AS NECESSARY - INFORM SUBORDINATE FSO/FO THAT APPROPRIATE TARGET IS IN EFFECT - ASSESS WHICH FIRE SUPPORT ASSET WILL SHOOT MISSION IF REQUESTED (81MM/105MM/155MM/NGF); SEND WARNING ORDER - APPROVE FIRE MISSION ONCE GRID IS CLEARED (SEE CLEARANCE OF FIRE DRILL)
TF ENG	- UPDATE ROUTE STATUS; RECOMMEND ALTERNATE ROUTES - REPORT ROUTE STATUS, HORIZONTALLY & VERTICALLY - COORD CLEARANCE OF ROUTE INCLUDING: SECURITY, FIRE SUPPORT; ASSESS ROUTE CLEARANCE ASSETS (MICLIC, PLOWS, ROLLERS, REMOTE ASSETS) - IF CACHE IS FOUND, ASSIST IN DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT AS REQUIRED	- CHECK ROUTE STATUS TO SUPPORT CASEVAC, RESUPPLY, MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS - IF ROUTE IS NOT CLEAR, COORD ROUTE CLEARANCE INCLUDING: SECURITY, FIRE SUPPORT; ASSESS ROUTE CLEARANCE ASSETS (MICLIC, PLOWS, ROLLERS, REMOTE ASSETS)
TF ADO	- ASSESS APPLICABLE ENEMY AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH - REVIEW STATUS OF ASSETS IN VICINITY AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY - ALERT SUBORDINATE UNITS OF POSSIBLE AIR MEDEVAC	- ASSESS APPLICABLE ENEMY AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH - REVIEW STATUS OF ASSETS IN VICINITY AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY - NOTIFY SUBORD OF PENDING FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY AS NECESSARY
TF S1/S4 MEDO	- PLOT REPORT - DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN ALOC - COORD RECOVERY OPERATION AS NECESSARY (SECURITY, ROUTE) - SEND WARNING ORDER TO CASEVAC ASSETS - IF GROUND EVAC, COORD FOR SECURITY AND ROUTE CLEARANCE - IF AIR MEDEAVAC, COORD CLEARANCE OF AIRSPACE - OBTAIN UPDATED COMBAT POWER, LOGSTATS REPORTS AS NECESSARY - COORD LOG RESUPPLY IF REQUIRED - IF ENEMY CACHE IS FOUND, ASSESS TRANS REQUIREMENTS TO MOVE EQUIP OR CL V REQUIREMENTS TO DESTROY EQUIP - INITIATE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RECONSTITUTION PROCEDURES AS NECESSARY.	- PLOT REPORT -DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN ALOC - COORD RECOVERY OPERATION AS NECESSARY (SECURITY, ROUTE) - SEND WARNING ORDER TO CASEVAC ASSETS - IF GROUND EVAC, COORD FOR SECURITY AND ROUTE CLEARANCE - IF AIR MEDEAVAC, COORD CLEARANCE OF AIRSPACE - OBTAIN UPDATED COMBAT POWER, LOGSTATS REPORTS AS NECESSARY - COORD LOG RESUPPLY IF REQUIRED - INITIATE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RECONSTITUTION PROCEDURES AS NECESSARY.
TF SIGO	- ASSESS NEED FOR RETRANS SUPPORT	- ASSESS NEED FOR RETRANS SUPPORT
CA/PSYOP/PAO	- ASSESS NEED FOR PRESS RELEASE - ASSESS NEED FOR PSYOP/CA INVOLVEMENT	- ASSESS NEED FOR PRESS RELEASE - ASSESS NEED FOR PSYOP/CA INVOLVEMENT

DRILL/ SECTION	CLEARANCE OF FIRES	REACT TO ENEMY INDIRECT FIRES
TF S2	- PLOT/UPDATE ENEMY TARGET - UPDATE/ADJUST SITTEMPs AS REQUIRED - PASS INFORMATION HORIZONTALLY/VERTICALLY AS NECESSARY - RECEIVE ENEMY BDA AND ASSESS ENEMY STRENGTH	- IF RADAR ACQUIRED FIRE MISSION, PLOT LOCATION - UPDATE/ADJUST SITTEMPs AS REQUIRED - CONDUCT PATTERN ANALYSIS - PASS INFORMATION HORIZONTALLY/VERTICALLY AS NECESSARY
TF S3	- RECEIVE REQUEST FOR INDIRECT FIRES - VERIFY FRIENDLY UNIT LOCATIONS VICINITY CONTACT - PASS TARGET DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION TO S2 - ONCE GRID IS CLEARED, NOTIFY FSE AND OTHER STAFF SECTIONS IN TOC AND APPROVE FIRE MISSION - MONITOR FIRE MISSION AND GET ENEMY BDA; PASS TO S2	- RECEIVE REPORT - DISSEMINATE REPORT THROUGHOUT TOC - IF RADAR ACQUIRED FIRE MISSION, GET LOCATION AND PLOT - VERIFY FRIENDLY UNIT LOCATIONS VICINITY CONTACT - ONCE GRID IS CLEARED, NOTIFY FSE AND OTHER STAFF SECTIONS IN TOC AND APPROVE FIRE MISSION - MONITOR FIRE MISSION, AND GET ENEMY BDA; PASS TO S2 - ASSESS NEED TO UPGRADE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES - ASSESS NEED FOR CASEVAC; COORD AS NECESSARY - REPORT INCIDENT TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
TF FSE	- RECEIVE REQUEST FOR INDIRECT FIRES; PASS INFO TO S3/BATTLE CPT - COORD AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT WITH AVN - ONCE GRID IS CLEARED, APPROVE FIRING OF MISSION - MONITOR FIRE MISSION AND GET ENEMY BDA; PASS TO S2/S3 - ASSESS NEED TO REPOSITION INDIRECT FIRE ASSETS	- CONTACT DS BN TO DETERMINE IF RADARS ACQUIRED FIRE MISSION - IF RADAR DID ACQUIRE, GET LOCATION AND PASS TO BATTLE CPT - COORD AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT WITH AVN - ONCE GRID IS CLEARED, APPROVE FIRING OF MISSION - MONITOR FIRE MISSION AND GET ENEMY BDA; PASS TO S2/S3 - ASSESS NEED TO REPOSITION INDIRECT FIRE ASSETS
TF ENG	- ASSESS MOBILITY DAMAGE ALONG KEY ROUTES AS NECESSARY	- CHECK ROUTE STATUS TO SUPPORT CASEVAC/RESUPPLY/MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS - IF ROUTE IS NOT CLEAR, COORD ROUTE CLEARANCE WITH S3 INCLUDING SECURITY, FIRE SUPPORT
TF ADO	- ASSESS APPLICABLE ENEMY AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH - REVIEW STATUS OF ASSETS IN VICINITY AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY	- ASSESS APPLICABLE ENEMY AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH - REVIEW STATUS OF ASSETS IN VICINITY AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY
TF S1/S4 MEDO	- PLOT REPORT - DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN ALOC - COORD CL V RESUPPLY AS NECESSARY	- PLOT REPORT - DISSEMINATE REPORT WITHIN ALOC - SEND WARNING ORDER TO CASEVAC ASSETS - IF GROUND EVAC, COORD FOR SECURITY, ROUTE CLEARANCE, AND ESCORT AS NECESSARY - IF AIR MEDEAVAC, COORD CLEARANCE OF AIRSPACE - OBTAIN UPDATED COMBAT POWER, LOGSTATS REPORTS AS NECESSARY - COORD RECOVERY OPERATION (SECURITY) - COORD LOG RESUPPLY
TF SIGO		
CA/PSYOP/PAO	- ASSESS NEED TO PREPARE PRESS RELEASE	- ASSESS NEED TO PREPARE PRESS RELEASE

Issue: To be successful using the search and attack technique, you must be capable of rapidly fixing and finishing the enemy before he attrits and breaks contact with your unit.

Discussion: Once contact with the enemy is made, simple and effective systems must be in place to facilitate fixing and destroying the enemy force. Rapidly massing the effects of ground maneuver, indirect fire, and attack aviation assets is critical. These are the most common resources directly involved in fixing and finishing the enemy.

Massing the effects of ground maneuver assets can be the most time consuming of the three options depending on the proximity to the initial contact. If the necessary ground maneuver assets are in the immediate area, they can readily contribute to the fight. This is often not the case. Normally squads and platoons must first be consolidated and then moved to where the contact occurred. By this time the enemy has engaged, attritted your force, and broken contact. There are no easy solutions to this problem. There are, however, a few considerations, that if implemented can improve your ability to rapidly mass your ground maneuver assets.

The **first consideration** involves the physical size of your area of operations (AO). You may not be able to control the actual size of your AO, but you can subdivide your AO into zones of action that can help focus the efforts of subordinate units. By keeping the area relatively small, your forces are automatically closer together which decreases the time and distance required to support an adjacent unit once contact with the enemy is made. By analyzing your area of operations, and determining where contact with the enemy is most likely to occur, you can begin to reduce your search area, thus increasing your ability to rapidly consolidate forces once contact is made. This technique can be applied from squad to battalion level.

The **second consideration** involves the use of graphic control measures. Graphic control measures are useful in providing the flexibility needed to implement decisions rapidly. Adequate graphic control measures facilitate link ups, control direct and indirect fires, and control movement of your subordinate units. When conducting search and attacks, some of the more useful graphic control measures include checkpoints, linkup points, and target reference points. These graphic control measures facilitate linkups between units, control unit movements, and request and control supporting fires. Their wide scale use and dissemination help reduce the time required to pass orders and facilitate a common understanding of those orders and instructions.

The **last consideration** involves the size of the core unit operating throughout your area of operations. Generally in the search and attack environment, the core size unit is the platoon. Additional time is required to assemble a significant force if the unit is operating below platoon level.

Integrating aviation assets into the search and attack is the most difficult of the three resources (ground maneuver, artillery, and aviation), but if thoroughly planned and rehearsed can be one of the most responsive and decisive fixing or finishing forces available. The most difficult challenge to overcome when integrating aviation assets is establishing timely communications between the ground element in contact and the aviation scout weapons team. The unit must have standing operating procedures in place to facilitate the passing of timely, clear and concise orders and instructions between the aviation and ground maneuver assets. Below are some ideas to help alleviate this problem.

Ideally the scout weapons team is actively involved in the search and attack, or at least pre-positioned in a designated holding area prepared to support the search and attack. If not, the ground element in contact requests aviation support through its chain of command to the supporting aviation unit. The FRAGO to the scout weapons team must include the following information:

- **location of the designated holding area**
- **routes, corridors, or air axis to holding area**
- **alternate holding area location**
- **location of the engagement area/objective area**
- **frequency/call sign of the supported battalion headquarters**

Once this information is provided, the scout weapons team can be dispatched. While enroute to the holding area, the scout weapons team contacts the supported battalion headquarters. Once radio contact is established, the supported battalion provides the scout weapons team the following information:

- **location of primary and alternate holding areas**
- **enemy and friendly situation update**
- **frequency/call sign of unit in contact**

The scout weapons team then contacts the subordinate unit in contact (on the supported units frequency) and provides them the following information:

- **current location**
- **station time and duration**
- **armament capabilities (weapons type and number of rounds available)**
- **night-vision capabilities**

Once the above information is passed, the *unit in contact* then passes the following information to the scout weapons team:

- **enemy/friendly situation**
- **proposed mission statement for scout weapons team**
- **concept of operations**
- **location of battle positions or attack by fire positions**
- **lift and shift signals**
- **method of marking friendly units**

This process must occur over a very short amount of time and can only be streamlined through detailed planning, coordination, and rehearsals. The aviation trainers at the Joint Readiness Training Center developed a "How to Video" titled ***Air-To Ground Coordination in the Hasty Attack,*** that discusses these procedures in detail.

Integrating indirect fires into the search and attack is the other critical aspect of fixing and finishing the enemy. With detailed planning, coordination, and rehearsals, indirect fires can be even more responsive and just as decisive as the integration of aviation assets. Once again this requires detailed and enforced standing operating procedures and battle drills. Effective integration begins with detailed planning. Indirect fires must be planned for and anticipated during each phase of the search and attack. Some of the more critical planning considerations include:

➤Plan priority targets along designated routes, ambush and blocking positions, and templated enemy locations.

➤Plan to cancel and activate these priority targets in conjunction with the movement of the supported unit.

➤Identify units operating in and around your area. Determine current and planned locations of these units. This will assist you in clearing fires once requested. Typically this becomes an issue with assets such as low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, long-range surveillance (LRS) teams, and other assets that are not organic or attached to your unit.

➤Allocate appropriate weapon systems to provide immediate fire support to the ground maneuver unit.

The following are considerations during the execution phase:

➤Platoon forward observers must know and report their exact locations at all times. Use a ground positioning system to confirm location. Input targets as way points to confirm your location with respect to a specific target.

➤Fire marking rounds if needed to identify exact target location.

➤Cancel and update priority targets during your movement.

➤Once requested, make bold corrections as necessary, or creep the supporting fires into position to isolate, fix, or suppress the enemy.

➤Subordinate units must constantly update and report their current location to facilitate rapid clearance of fires.

➤Pre-clear fires if possible, so the only clearance of fires that will be necessary is that of the requesting unit.

The Fire Support Trainers from the Joint Readiness Training Center published an article, ***Fast and Accurate Fires in the Close Fight,*** in the **CALL CTC Bulletin No. 96-4, Mar 96.** This article discusses this issue in detail.

TTP:

Ground Maneuver Specific:

✱When conducting the IPB, carefully analyze your AO to determine where contact with the enemy is most likely to occur. Designate these areas as zones of action to help reduce the physical size of your AO and to help focus the effort of subordinate units.

✱Use sufficient graphic control measures to incorporate flexibility into your plan.

✱Consciously decide and enforce what core size unit at which you will operate. This decision can potentially increase your ability to rapidly mass the effects of your ground maneuver assets.

Aviation Specific:

✱Ensure your soldiers understand the basic capabilities, weapons effects, safety considerations, night-vision capabilities, and radio capabilities of aviation assets.

✱Ensure supporting aviation units understand your unit-marking procedures. The procedures may include the use of chem lights, strobe lights, MRE heaters, colored smoke, or laser pointers.

✱Ensure you incorporate graphic control measures to facilitate the integration of aviation assets. These graphic control measures should include holding areas, attack-by-fire positions, checkpoints, and battle positions.

✱Review, refine, and develop as necessary your procedures to facilitate the integration and synchronization of the scout weapons team. Use the procedures listed above as a starting point and adjust as necessary. These procedures must be rehearsed at all levels down to and including squad level.

✱Order the JRTC "How to Video," *Air-to-Ground Coordination in the Hasty Attack,* and incorporate these concepts into your unit training program.

Fire Support Specific:

✱Indirect fires can best be used as a means to block and fix the enemy versus destroying the enemy.

✱Plan and adjust priority targets along movement routes.

✱There are no easy solutions to clearance of fire procedures. A well-rehearsed staff battle drill (see page IV-3 or IV-4 for example battle drill), and good unit reporting procedures enhance your ability to rapidly clear fires. Ensure all subordinate units constantly report and update their location to facilitate rapid clearance of fires.

✱Forward observers should use ground positioning systems to confirm current locations to facilitate rapid calls for fires.

Issue: ***Action or inaction during the first minutes of contact with the enemy determines the outcome of the engagement.***

Discussion: Once contact with the enemy is made, the initial actions of the unit are absolutely critical in determining the outcome of the engagement. The unit that immediately seizes the initiative generally establishes and maintains control of the engagement. At the JRTC, it is not uncommon for the BLUFOR to sustain casualties at a ratio of seven friendly casualties to one OPFOR casualty. There are many reasons why this occurs; below are some of the more important reasons:

(1) The enemy usually initiates the contact when they are at the advantage. Many times the enemy initiates contact against a lone squad or fire team conducting either a reconnaissance and security patrol or a squad movement to contact operation. Currently, most squads are manned with seven personnel; some squads are even smaller. As a result the BLUFOR is fighting the OPFOR at essentially a one-to-one ratio.

(2) The friendly force often moves using an inappropriate movement technique or formation and when contact is made, the friendly unit is not postured to effectively react. Poor soldier situational awareness also contributes to units being engaged by an unseen enemy from a position of advantage.

(3) Units do not normally execute react to contact battle drills effectively. Units are often slow react as contact with the enemy is made. Overwhelming suppressive fire and well-aimed shots are not achieved, leader assessment of the situation is slow, and a maneuver force is not deployed to an assailable flank to destroy the enemy. Either calls for indirect fire are not initiated or indirect fires are not responsive.

(4) Often, when units sustain a casualty, the mission focus diverts from destroying the enemy to conducting casualty evacuation. Today's infantry squad manning levels are approximately seven soldiers per squad. When the squad sustains a casualty, a combat lifesaver is usually employed to treat the wounded soldier. The squad-size element now becomes a fire team, losing its ability to effectively fire and maneuver against the enemy. This situation forces the squad leader to make a decision to continue the fight or secure and evacuate the casualty. If the squad leader decides to evacuate the casualty, four personnel may be required to move the casualty if the injuries are serious, or the casualty must be moved an extended distance. The squad now has three personnel to secure the evacuation process. Because the squad cannot adequately secure themselves, the OPFOR then continues to attrit the squad as they evacuate the casualty.

TTP:

✱The React to Contact battle drill should be the number one training priority for squads and platoons.

✱Do not task squads to conduct movement to contact operations. If squads are tasked to conduct R&S patrols, platoon leaders should ensure they have adequate combat power to defeat the enemy during contact. Task two squads to conduct R&S patrols, and keep one squad in the quick reaction force role with the platoon sergeant. The platoon leader and FO can move with one squad (probably the platoon main effort). If contact is made, the platoon sergeant can maneuver the QRF. Patrol plans must be detailed, and graphics provided to the company commander. The platoon leader should constantly update the commander on the progress of the patrol.

✱Use the appropriate movement techniques and formations given the METT-T conditions. In addition to the three movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch), FM 7-8 and FM 7-10 outlines various movement formations for squads and platoons (p. 2-29 and p. 2-37) and company movement formations (p. 3-3).

A company movement formation that is effective at JRTC is similar to the approach march movement to contact technique. This movement formation and the associated battle drill when contact is made are not fully addressed in FM 7-10, but are based on observations from several JRTC rotations. The company moves in column with a platoon as an "advanced guard" no more than 200 meters forward of the company main body. The purpose of the advanced guard is to provide early warning for the rest of the company and to fix the enemy if contact is made. The rest of the company moves with the same dispersion as the traveling overwatch movement technique. A 60-mm mortar squad is attached to the advanced guard. When contact is made to the front, the 60-mm mortar can move to a firing position and ideally direct-lay fires at enemy locations, while the rest of the platoon fixes the enemy with direct fire. For this technique to be effective, the company must have a good drill for consolidating mortar rounds with the mortar squad. A technique is to use three stakes colored red, green, and yellow (the same color chemlites should be fixed to the stakes for limited visibility). Soldiers carrying the various mortar rounds (WP, HE, and illumination) can place the rounds at a respective stake. This eases identification of the rounds for the mortar squad. The rounds can be dropped off as soldiers occupy support by fire positions. As the lead platoon fixes the enemy, the mortar squad to the rear can place fires behind and to the flanks to further fix the enemy. The rest of the drill consists of a hasty attack based on the commander's assessment of the situation.

✱Develop casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) drills for actions on contact. A technique is to establish a CASEVAC team under the control of the 1SG or platoon sergeant. The team also consists of the senior line medic and possibly a squad for casualty collection point (CCP) security and to transport casualties. Once contact is made, the CASEVAC team immediately establishes the CCP. Four colored stakes (with chemlites attached for limited visibility) are positioned for urgent, priority, routine casualties, and KIA personnel (out of sight of the casualties). This greatly facilitates triage and expedites evacuation. As the remainder of the company or platoon continues the fight, the 1SG/platoon sergeant coordinates for evacuation of the casualties. If a platoon or squad is not committed to the fight, they should assist in securing the CCP and the evacuation site. If aerial MEDEVAC is being used for evacuation, the element can establish and secure the pickup zone or they can secure the ground evacuation pickup point. Units must maximize the use of combat lifesavers, SKEDs and poleless litters for evacuation. At squad level, this drill is much more difficult - - another reason why movement to contacts should not be conducted independently at squad level.

Issue: Reserves are often not responsive at the decisive moment during a battle.

Discussion: Most units designate either a reserve, quick reaction force (QRF), or follow and support element to support the search and attack. As defined in FM 101-5-1, the reserve and follow and support (QRF is not defined in the manual) are clearly different missions. However, all three potentially offer the commander flexibility and the ability to mass combat power at the decisive time and place. Unfortunately commanders and staffs do not thoroughly wargame how, when, and where they want to commit these elements. When the reserve is committed, it rarely has a positive impact on the operation because it usually cannot get to the decisive point in a timely manner with the right force mix.

Poor employment of the reserve is the result of several factors which include:

1. The reserve is usually located at the brigade or battalion TOC or combat trains waiting for the order to move. Unless the reserve is positioned at a responsive location to all units in the area of operation, it is unlikely that its employment will be decisive. Plans for employment of the reserve must consider the following:

➤***How long it takes from receipt of the mission to execution.*** The reserve will have to receive the mission, conduct an abbreviated mission analysis, issue a FRAGO, load transportation, move to a debarking point, move to the objective area, assess the situation, and then deploy accordingly.

➤***Method of transportation to the objective area.*** Methods of transportation include trucks, air assets, or foot movement. Each method is accompanied with its own set of disadvantages:

TRUCK MOVEMENT

Is there a route to the objective area? Has the route been cleared of mines?

Security of the convoy?

Truck assets available vs other mission requirements?

Movement from the debark point to the objective area?

AIR ASSETS

Aircraft availability? Landing zone in vicinity of the objective area?

Air mission brief, SEAD, attack helicopter security.

Command and control of the air assault? Air Assault Task Force Commander?

FOOT MOVEMENT

Response time to the objective area?

Physical condition of unit when they arrive at the objective area?

Friction of land navigation, chance contacts, and linkups?

2. Decision points to commit the reserve are seldom wargamed. The purpose of the reserve is to provide decisive action at a critical point in the battle. Potential critical points must be identified prior to the execution of the operation to ensure effective employment of the reserve.

3. The reserve is an uncommitted force and doctrinally cannot be tasked with another mission. However, the commander of the reserve can arguably be given "be prepared missions" and "priorities in planning." Both will save a great deal of time when the reserve is tasked to execute a mission. For example, the reserve commander may be given the following guidance:

". . .In priority, the reserve must plan to (1) move to checkpoint 1 and assume the mission of the finish force, (2) move to checkpoint 2 and establish blocking positions to prevent withdrawal of the enemy from the objective area, (3) move to the objective and continue the attack east to ensure complete destruction of the enemy. . . ."

TTP: **A follow and support unit (or quick reaction force) may be more appropriate for a search and attack. A unit given a follow and support mission is not a reserve. Follow and support is an operation in which a committed force follows and supports the mission accomplishment of a force conducting offensive operations. A unit given this mission may destroy bypassed units, conduct a relief in place, block enemy movements, secure lines of communications, and any other operation the commander deems necessary. In a battalion search and attack, the follow and support element could be positioned behind the finishing force or at any location that would ensure responsive support to the battalion.**

Issue: The capabilities of armor or mechanized units are not maximized during search and attacks.

Discussion: Search and attacks are most often conducted in environments that are best suited for light infantry operations. However, heavy-light operations are common to most contingency missions. Most infantry brigade task forces will conduct contingency operations with an attached armor or mechanized company team. Except for mines and a scarce number of light antitank weapons, most enemies in a low intensity environment do not possess a decisive antiarmor capability. As a result, armor or mechanized assets can be very effective as a finishing or fixing force.

Clearly, employment of armor or mechanized assets requires a corridor, normally roads or trails, which facilitate maneuver. These routes must be cleared. Of all units in the task organization, armor or mechanized units are the best suited to perform a reserve role because they do not require external transportation requirements. However, the enemy in a low-intensity environment rarely occupies positions that are readily accessible to heavy vehicles. Consequently, the decision criteria to employ the armor assets must be predicated on their ability to influence the action at the decisive time and place. The decision criteria must be established during the wargaming process.

Armor/mech assets can also be used in an overwatch position or as an observation post (OP) which maximizes the capabilities of the weapons to include thermal optics at night. When employed in overwatch or as an OP, dismounted security should be provided.

TTP:

✱Routes into the objective area must be trafficable. A supporting task to this effort may be a route reconnaissance by the scout platoon followed by route clearance operations. Routes should be cleared into the objective area as far as possible, without compromising the operation.

✱Measures for identification of friendly forces must be developed. The likelihood of fratricide of dismounted infantry by armor is potentially high if detailed control measures are not established.

✱The armor unit must be able to communicate with the dismounted unit in contact and a command and control relationship must be established. Ideally, the battalion commander on the ground or the TAC will command and control the employment of the armor assets. However, this is not always feasible. Consequently, the dismounted unit in contact should command and control the employment of the armor assets once they reach the objective area. This lowers the risk of fratricide and helps ensure unity of effort in finishing the enemy. Rarely will the armor unit be capable of completely finishing the enemy by itself because of terrain constraints. However, the armor assets can perform a supporting role by fixing the enemy as they withdraw or supporting by fire as the finishing force conducts the assault. To successfully accomplish these tasks, the dismounted unit commander must be able to talk to the armor leader.

Issue: Leaders and soldiers are not intimately familiar with intelligence indicators that will assist them in identifying the enemy.

Discussion: Normally, infantry platoons and squads serve as part of the find force. These squads and platoons typically conduct zone or area reconnaissance missions to locate enemy targets. These targets often include mortars, logistics or cache sites, and command, control, and communication (C3) sites. However, individual soldiers who actually conduct the search usually cannot provide any detailed information on sites for which they are specifically looking. They know they are searching for an enemy mortar site, but cannot describe the indicators that may lead them to the actual mortar site. This information typically includes the following: number of enemy personnel at the locations, types of terrain where the target can be located, and types of equipment associated with that specific target. This information is critical in assisting the soldier as he searches for the specific target.

The following discussion represents some of the characteristics of enemy targets in a low-intensity environment. The following information specifically addresses the JRTC, OPFOR threat model for an insurgent force. In areas where future continency operations may be conducted, enemy indicators will probably be different. Units conducting a contingency operation in a low-intensity environment may not have the luxury of knowing the enemy order of battle. In this situation, they will have to conduct thorough patrol debriefs or interview local inhabitants to develop an appropriate list of indicators. Regardless, this list provides a starting point that can be used and adjusted as necessary.

TTP:

(1) ENEMY MORTARS.

INDICATORS:

- **A three- to five-man team carrying ruck sacks with radio.**
- **Soldiers carrying black cylindrical casings.**
- **The sound of a mortar firing.**
- **Being engaged by a four-man team at longer than usual ranges (200+ meters).**
- **A four-man team that blatantly exposes itself to lure you away from the firing point.**
- **The finding of a mortar ammunition cache.**
- **The finding of numerous booby traps.**

ENEMY MORTAR TACTICS/TECHNIQUES:

The OPFOR mortar section usually has a minimum of three firing positions within its area of operation. A cache of mortar rounds is located within 200-300 meters of the firing positions. The section will normally fire several rounds and move to its alternate firing position to avoid being detected by acquisition radars. If the section leader determines that the section is about to be compromised, a team may be deployed to lure that element away from the location. Firing positions require the same traits as those used by U.S. mortars - mask and overhead clearance. However, the hide positions are usually in dense terrain. Locating a mortar cache is a key intelligence indicator because the firing positions are normally in close proximity. Soldiers should able to distinguish the following: whether it is an old or recent cache, if the rounds are expended, or whether they are U.S. or enemy mortar rounds. If foliage is dried or the camouflage is washed away, then it is probably an old cache. Once the cache is found, the leader can draw a concentric 300-meter circle on his map around the location. The leader can then analyze the terrain within the 300-meter circle to determine possible mortar locations.

If the unit is engaged by a four-man element from a distance greater than 200 meters, it is possible that the enemy team is attempting to lure a unit away from the mortars. It is also likely that the mortar section is attempting to displace. Consequently, the leader should attempt to fix the four-man team. Upon completion of a quick map analysis, the unit should maneuver an element(s) to possible avenues of egress. Another element can also be tasked to clear likely hide sites or firing locations.

A very effective technique to locate the mortars is through crater analysis. However, this is the least accepted method because mortar rounds are fired and soldiers may be wounded or killed as a result. Nonetheless, all soldiers within the platoon should be trained in crater analysis procedures. The most accepted technique to locate the mortars is through detailed analysis and planning.

(2) LOGISTICS/CACHE SITE.

INDICATORS:

- **The finding of any food, water, or fuel.**
- **The sighting of an enemy helicopter or resupply aircraft.**
- **The sighting of an enemy aircraft or vehicle around suspected enemy LZs.**
- **The sighting of enemy resupply vehicles such as all terrain vehicles (ATV), bicycles, or trucks.**
- **Tire tracks appropriate to the vehicles listed above.**
- **Grass, dirt, or foliage that looks out of place.**

ENEMY TACTICS/TECHNIQUES:

The enemy normally places great emphasis on concealing their logistics/cache sites. These efforts include burying the caches and camouflaging them. In addition, a large cache site, such as a battalion supply point (BSP), can be extended over distances in excess of 600 meters with several smaller caches of items such as air defense missiles and mortar rounds, mines, water, and food in the area. The supply points are normally located in low ground in the vicinity of a water supply and trail or road network which is easily accessible. Deception BSPs are also used extensively. The enemy may intentionally expose and booby-trap deception BSPs. The JRTC OPFOR rarely booby-traps items that they want to access. Several different types of supply points are also used. The supply transfer point (STP) is used as a central location where supplies are transferred between BSPs and company supply points (CSPs). STPs usually have several HMMWVs, possibly an ATV, and a three- or four-person security force. The CSP may have a squad security force and the BSP may have up to a platoon minus (15 personnel) at that location. It is also important to note that the OPFOR will use the supply points only when forced.

The preferred method to locate a logistics site is to observe either its use, preparation, or resupply of the site. Appropriate vehicle noises and tire tracks leading into low areas are good indicators that a supply point may be in the vicinity. The enemy may use helicopters or other aircraft (even civilian aircraft) to conduct resupply operations. Soldiers should note the landing or taking off of enemy helicopters or other aircraft and notify their leaders. They should get an azimuth and orient the possible LZ in relation to key terrain features. Once the unit determines they might have located a logistics site, they must be prepared to conduct an extensive search of the area to find all the supplies. They may include using wooden stakes or E-tools to probe the ground to find buried caches. In addition, the unit must resolve what it is going to do with all the supplies once it finds them. Options include transporting them on vehicles or destroying them with demolitions. The unit must also be prepared to defend the site against a counterattack. The enemy will generally fight hard to keep a BSP, and counterattack as necessary to regain control of a lost BSP.

(3) COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C^3) SITES.

INDICATORS:

- **Enemy soldiers with the rank of Platoon Sergeant or above.**
- **Radios with long-range antenna systems.**
- **Enemy soldiers carrying leader-type sidearms (pistols).**

ENEMY TACTICS/TECHNIQUES:

Enemy C^3 sites are generally very austere with only three or four personnel, a radio, and a long-range antenna system. The C^3 site is positioned where it can communicate, but the site will be well camouflaged. If the site becomes compromised, an enemy soldier may attempt to lure the attacking force away from the site or attempt to fix with fire. The remainder of the C^3 element may attempt to break contact to a pre-established linkup point.

Unless the unit has access to Low-Level Voice Intercept or QUICK FIX information, it is very difficult to locate a C^3 site. Sometimes they are only located by chance. However, if the unit makes contact with a lone enemy soldier, there is the possibility that the unit compromised an enemy C^3 site. The unit should execute the react to contact battle drill.

(4) OTHER INDICATORS:

OPFOR maps are usually sterilized when they enter an operation. If there are graphics on a map, then they are probably for deception purposes. However, the soldier should not decide this for himself. All information should be expedited to the unit S2 for analysis. Many times, enemy soldiers hide useful information in very inconspicuous places. Soldiers must conduct very thorough searches to obtain the potential information.

Collecting information on the enemy and converting it to useful intelligence products is a key to success on any battlefield. However, soldiers must know what to look for to be situationally aware and obtain the information. It is paramount that leaders provide the soldiers the most current tactics and techniques of an opposing force, whether it is on the island of Atlantica in Cortina (JRTC) or against a more unforgiving enemy in a real-world contingency operation. Although the tactics and techniques of that enemy may change, the tasks and standards of analysis remain the same.

Chapter V
HOME-STATION TRAINING

This chapter is designed to provide you additional ideas to better prepare your unit for search and attacks. Most of these ideas require minimal resources and can be incorporated into your home station training program.

1. Begin by reviewing your mission-essential task list (METL). Crosswalk all the individual tasks associated with each METL task that supports the find, fix, and finish functions. Once all the individual tasks have been identified, soldiers should be trained and evaluated on their ability to execute the tasks. ARTEP 7-8 MTP provides a collective task-to-individual task matrix that will help you develop the foundation for individual training in preparation for search and attacks.

2. Develop and conduct situational training exercises (STXs) that incorporate the standard infantry squad and platoon battle drills. Squad and platoon external evaluations should focus on successful execution of these drills. If squads and platoons cannot conduct the drills to standard, retrain them. This will have the greatest impact on the ability to conduct search and attacks than any other single issue. As previously stated, success is often determined during the first minute of contact. It is through violent, immediate, and well-rehearsed execution of simple battle drills that conditions are set for success. (For example STXs, see Appendix C.)

3. Incorporate the use of both mortars and artillery into your squad and platoon STXs. This will help develop a better understanding of how squad and platoon leaders can incorporate supporting fires into their find, fix, or finish functions. Conduct training to familiarize all soldiers with the basic call-for-fire procedures.

4. When conducting your STX training, ensure the designated OPFOR understands and executes the tactics, techniques and procedures of a legitimate threat model. Your OPFOR must possess a thorough understanding of the intelligence indicators and enemy tactics and techniques to accurately portray the enemy. This also provides your soldiers a great opportunity to become intimately familiar with the enemy.

5. Develop a scripted master events list (MEL) and conduct a command post exercise (CPX). Use this CPX to exercise the TOC's battle-tracking skills and reporting procedures. Platoon leaders and company commanders can render reports at designated times throughout the day which can then generate commander and staff actions. This CPX can easily be conducted in garrison by setting up the TOC and using either existing phone lines or tactical communication systems. Developing the MEL is great training opportunity in itself. If developed collectively with all staff members, MEL development is essentially a wargaming session of all possible events a staff may face during a search and attack, as well as development of a staff action plan for each event.

6. Conduct professional development (PD) classes. Begin with the basics by teaching and discussing search and attack doctrine. Once the soldiers and leaders thoroughly understand the doctrinal implications of the search and attack, expand your PD classes. Additional recommendations include:

➤Develop and reinforce existing unit standing operating procedures.

➤Wargame unit and soldier actions when intelligence indicators are observed. Characteristics and pictures of the indicators and enemy targets should be posted on every company bulletin board. Soldiers should be able to recite from memory the characteristics, intelligence indicators, and enemy tactics for all potential targets.

➤Wargame when reserves and QRFs should be committed. Identify what decision points trigger employment of these units.

➤Discuss actions and coordination measures for the employment of attack aviation assets. This should be done down to the squad leader level. Identify the actions that must occur when a squad leader needs to direct attack aviation using a PRC 126 or how the communications are linked between the squad leader and platoon leader if contact cannot be established on the squad radio.

➤Use terrain models to discuss the various movement techniques and formations that should be employed based on different METT-T conditions. Talk through the execution of a zone or area reconnaissance given those factors.

➤Conduct map board discussions on likely locations of different types of enemy targets and the most effective methods to find, fix, and finish the enemy given those conditions.

➤Conduct classes that present methods of how to destroy enemy equipment, ammunition, or supplies. These classes should discuss techniques to be used with, or without the use of demolitions.✪

APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE TARGETING MEETING AGENDA

This appendix is designed to provide you with an example targeting meeting agenda. The targeting process provides the staff a means to focus and synchronize the unit's efforts based on the current enemy situation, current friendly unit success or lack of success, and directives from higher. The targeting process can also be used as an effective means to assess the current factors of METT-T to determine if some change or modification to your current plan is necessary. Conduct the targeting process based on orders and instructions you have received from your higher headquarters, or because the conditions within your area of operations dictate the need for a subtle change to the existing plan. The end state of the targeting meeting should be a FRAGO to subordinate units that will direct the detection, delivery of combat power, and assessment of targets designated by the commander. Use this example as a guide and adjust as necessary to suit your needs.

I. **Focus:** Bn 12-24 hours out; Bde 24-36 hours out, or it can be tailored for a specific event.

II. **Staff preparation:** Sets the conditions for a short succinct targeting meeting.

S3:

- **Changes to commander's intent.**
- **Forces available. (Task organization)**
- **FRAGOs from higher headquarters.**
- **Current combat power.**
- **Subordinate unit situation update.**
- **Current target synchronization matrix (TSM).**
- **Planned operations.**

S2:

- **Current enemy situation. (SITTEMP)**
- **Current/proposed HVTs.**
- **Current/proposed PIR.**
- **Status of R&S plan.**
- **BDA of attacked targets. (Lasts 12-24 hours)**
- **Status of collection assets.**

FSO: **Status of fire support assets.**

ENG:

- ☛**Enemy mines/obstacles.**
- ☛**Friendly mines/obstacles.**
- ☛**Special mobility considerations.**

ADAO:

- ☛**Enemy air corridors.**
- ☛**Location of ADA assets.**

Civil Affairs:

- ☛**Population centers.**
- ☛**Protected areas.**
- ☛**Civilian information. (HUMINT)**

III. **Targeting/Synchronization Meeting Tools: (Visual Aids)**

- ☛**SITTEMP (next 12-24 hours).**
- ☛**Target synchronization matrix.**
- ☛**Proposed HPT list.**
- ☛**Detection/collection assets available.**
- ☛**Delivery assets available.**
- ☛**Proposed PIR.**
- ☛**Current task organization.**

IV. **Attendees:** Proposed composition of the planning team should include the following: Cdr, XO, S2, S3, S3 Air, FSO, ALO, TF Engineer, TF Air Defense Officer, S1, S4, Chemical officer, and Signal officer, and, if applicable: brigade targeting officer, ANGLICO, heavy TM LO, SOCCE, MP platoon leader, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, MI Company Commander, and aviation representative.

V. **Agenda:**

XO: **Focus of targeting/synchronization meeting.**

S2:

- ☛**Current SITTEMP. (Visual display, including radar acquisitions.)**
- ☛**Status of R&S plan.**
- ☛**BDA of attacked targets.**
- ☛**Status of collection/detection assets available.**
- ☛**Probable enemy COAs/HVTs.**

S3:

- ☛**Changes to commander's intent.**
- ☛**Requirements from higher headquarters.**
- ☛**Review of current operations/status of EEFI/FFIR.**
- ☛**Task organization.**
- ☛**Future operations.**

FSO: **Status of delivery assets available.**

CDR/XO/S3: **Approves PIR and HPT list.**

ALL: **XO leads BOS crosswalk through new TSM (Detect, Deliver, Assess).**

VI. **Products Produced:**

S2:

- ☛**Updated PIR.**
- ☛**Updated R&S plan.**

FSO: **Updated target list.**

S3:

- ☛**Target synchronization matrix (TSM).**
- ☛**Taskings/FRAGOs to subordinate units. (Includes S2 and FSO products as annexes.)**

VII. **Disseminate products to subordinate units.✪**

EXAMPLE TARGETING SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

	DECIDE			DETECT	DELIVER	DESIRED TARGET EFFECTS	ASSESS
SEQ NO.	TARGET DESCRIPTION	NAI	GRID	COLLECTOR/ ASSET/UNIT	ASSET/ UNIT		BDA COLLECTION
PRIORITY: P=LOW PRIORITY, FILE FOR FUTURE USE A=AS ACQUIRED I=IMMEDIATE	LEGEND: M=MORTAR L=LOGISTICS S=SURFACE TO AIR F=ARTILLERY C=C^2 I=INFANTRY A=ARMOR					D=DESTROY N=NEUTRALIZE S=SUPPRESS	FRAGO NO:_____ OPS LOG:_____

Appendix B
EXAMPLE BATTLE RHYTHM

Below is an example Brigade and Battalion Battle Rhythm. Once again the term "battle rhythm" describes those events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis that facilitates setting the conditions for success. Many factors help determine and establish a unit's battle rhythm. Some of these factors are your unit's state of training, the battle rhythm of your higher headquarters, and your current mission. Your battle rhythm must remain flexible. Some missions require much more time and effort to plan and prepare for than others. Additionally, your battle rhythm cannot be so inflexible that you fail to react to targets of opportunity as they present themselves on the battlefield. For a greater detailed discussion regarding this issue see page III-3.✪

TIME	BRIGADE	BATTALION	COMPANY	PLATOON
0500	STAFF ESTIMATES	STAFF ESTIMATES	EXECUTION	EXECUTION
0600	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB		
0700	CONFERENCE CALL W/DIV RECEIVE GUIDANCE			
0800	CONFERENCE CALL W/BN ISSUE GUIDANCE	CONFERENCE CALL W/BDE RECEIVE GUIDANCE		
0900	TDMP/TARGETING MGT	CONFERENCE CALL W/CO ISSUE GUIDANCE	CONF CALL W/BN	
1000		STAFF HUDDLE CDR BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION		
1100	ORDER PREP			
1200	ISSUE FRAGO (NEXT 24-36 HRS)	RECEIVE FRAGO ISSUE WARNORD	RECEIVE WARNORD	
1300	STAFF HUDDLE CDR BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION	TDMP/TARGETING MGT	ISSUE WARNORD 1	RECEIVE WARNORD 1
1400		ORDER PREP	TLP	TLP
1500		ISSUE FRAGO (NEXT 12-24 HRS)	RECEIVE FRAGO	
1600	BN CDR BACKBRIEF	BACKBRIEF TO BDE CDR STAFF HUDDLE INITIATE RECON	ISSUE WARNORD 2	RECEIVE WARNORD 2
1700	LOGPAC STAFF ESTIMATES	LOGPAC STAFF ESTIMATES	LOGPAC ISSUE FRAGO	RECEIVE FRAGO
1800	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB		
1900		CO CDR BACKBRIEF	BACKBRIEF TO BN CDR	
2000			REHEARSALS	REHEARSALS
2100	STAFF HUDDLE INTELL UPDATE	STAFF HUDDLE INTELL UPDATE	TROOP MOVEMENT	TROOP MOVEMENT
2200				
2300			EXECUTION/PREP	EXECUTION/PREP
2400				
0100				
0200	STAFF HUDDLE INTELL UPDATE	STAFF HUDDLE INTELL UPDATE		
0300				
0400				
0500	STAFF ESTIMATES	STAFF ESTIMATES		
0600	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB	SHIFT CHANGE/BUB		

Appendix C
STX LANES

This appendix is designed to provide a ready-to-use tool (Situational Training Exercise (STX) Lane packets) to better prepare squads and platoons for the search and attack. As previously discussed, success or failure in the search and attack is often determined by the actions or inactions of squads and platoons as they make initial contact with the enemy. The following recommended STXs are not designed to replace the standard battle drills outlined in FM 7-8. Instead, they are designed to augment and enhance your squad's or platoon's ability to execute those standard battle those drills. You can execute these STXs either in garrison or at local training areas with no or minimal resources (MILES, CL V, etc.). Some of the STXs require a small OPFOR, others require no OPFOR.

PRE-COMBAT INSPECTION (PCI) COMPETITION

One of the keys to success when conducting a search and attack is finding the enemy before he finds you. This task is critical to setting the conditions in your favor, and entails moving undetected. Conducting detailed PCIs greatly enhances the squad's and platoon's ability to move undetected. Poor PCIs result in metal-to-metal contact, improperly applied camouflage, and canteens that are not full - - all of which can contribute to being compromised. Soldiers and equipment must be soundproofed. This training is oriented toward every squad member, not just squad leaders. The endstate of the training is that every member of the squad knows the standard and how to identify and correct soundproofing and camouflage deficiencies.

1. **TASK:** Perform Pre-Combat Inspection prior to movement.

2. **CONDITIONS:** The squad is preparing to conduct a tactical movement. A soldier with several soundproofing and camouflage deficiencies must be inspected.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** In five minutes, the inspector must identify all soundproofing and camouflage deficiencies.

4. **SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS:**

(A). The inspector must identify all camouflage deficiencies to include:

(1). Proper application of camouflage paint to all exposed areas (face, hands, neck).

(2). Outline of helmet, weapon, and equipment is broken up using available materials.

(3). All glassy or bright equipment is camouflaged or removed.

(B). The inspector must identify all soundproofing deficiencies to include:

(1). Metal-to-metal contact on load-bearing equipment (LBE), weapons, and magazines.

(2). Canteens are full.

5. **TRAINING NOTES AND PROCEDURES:**

(A). This training can be conducted either as a platoon- or squad-level competition.

(B). The unit should have a soundproofing and camouflage SOP (as per the Soldier's Manuals) which is understood by all soldiers.

(C). The soldier that identifies all the deficiencies wins. A "soundproofing" competition can resolve any ties. In this competition, the soldiers who tie will have an LBE, weapon, magazines, and other equipment (NODs, Binoculars, etc.) laid out along with soundproofing material (550 cord, tape, cardboard). The soldiers will have 10 minutes to soundproof the equipment and don it. The soldiers would then be required to jump up and down, jog in place and execute combat rolls. The soldier whose equipment is best soundproofed wins.

(D). The key to this training is that soldiers understand the proper procedures for camouflage and soundproofing. The competition is a reinforcing tool that can be conducted in garrison, requiring few resources.

INTELLIGENCE (INTEL) INDICATOR LANE

Normally, platoons and squads are tasked, as part of the search and attack, to "locate" the enemy to facilitate a hasty or deliberate attack. Typical enemy targets include mortars, logistics or cache sites, and command, control, and communication (C^2) sites. Soldiers generally have problems identifying specific enemy intelligence indicators. The "Intel Indicator Lane" will train soldiers to identify characteristics of specific enemy targets. This lane requires minimal resources and preparation and provides a tremendous training opportunity.

1. **TASK:** Identify Characteristics of Enemy Targets.

2. **CONDITIONS:** The soldier is provided priority information requirements and characteristics of specific enemy targets. The soldier must negotiate a 300-meter lane, during daylight conditions, which contains indicators and characteristics of enemy targets. The lane is clearly marked.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** The soldier identifies all characteristics of enemy targets within 30 minutes.

4. **SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS:**

A. The soldier identifies characteristics of an enemy mortar.

(1). Mortar cache is identified.

(2). A previously occupied mortar position is identified (e.g., a location that has no masking of overhead fires, a baseplate has been emplaced/settled, etc.).

(3). The sound of a mortar firing is identified.

B. The soldier identifies the characteristics of an enemy cache/logistics site.

(1). Grass, dirt, foliage looks out of place. Once identified, the soldier must conduct a search to determine the type of cache by probing with a stick or E-tool.

(2). Fat, knobby, tire tracks.

(3). The sound or sighting of a vehicle (civilian truck, all terrain vehicle, or any mode of transportation that is capable of moving supplies).

(4). If an obvious cache is identified, the soldier must check for booby traps. He must inform the evaluator that the position may be a deception cache/logistic site.

(5). When the evaluator informs the soldier that a enemy resupply helicopter can be identified, the soldier must explain the following:

(a). The helicopter is probably conducting resupply operations.

(b). Determine an azimuth and distance to the suspected LZ, noting key terrain features.

C. The soldier identifies the characteristics of an enemy command and control site.
(1). The soldier identifies a long-range antenna system.
(2). The soldier identifies the sound of a radio-breaking squelch.
(3). When the evaluator asks for the other characteristics of a C2 site, the soldier explains:
(a). Any enemy soldier with the rank of platoon sergeant or above.
(b). An enemy soldier carrying a pistol or some other similar type side arm.
(c). An enemy soldier carrying a radio.

D. When the evaluator informs the soldier that he has just observed or heard a suspected surface-to-air missile, the soldier must explain that it is possibly an enemy ADA launch. The soldier then determines the azimuth and distance to the sighting and informs his team leader.

E. The soldier obtains all information from an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) and conducts a thorough search of the EPW and his equipment.

5. **TRAINING NOTES AND PROCEDURES:**

A. This training lane can be potentially time and resource intensive, especially if local training areas are not available. Good preparation is key to success. The sites, particularly the caches and mortar positions, must be prepared to realistically portray the intended site.

B. To expedite time, soldiers can be sent through at intervals which requires several evaluators, or an entire squad can move through the lane (moving tactically) with the platoon leader or company commander as the evaluator.

C. If conducted at squad level, additional tasks may include searching an enemy battalion supply point (BSP). The contents of a BSP are usually buried and well-camouflaged, which requires the unit to probe and cover an extensive distance.

D. For further information, refer to the article “Intelligence Indicators” in the Jan-Feb 96 issue of CALL’s publication,***News from the Front!***

SOLDIER STEALTH AND UNOBSERVED MOVEMENT LANE

Most soldiers do not understand the discipline and patience required to move with stealth. As any sniper school graduate will tell you - - it is difficult work that requires training. This is a very simple lane which requires minimum resources and is structured after the Army Sniper School. Soldiers who have graduated from the Sniper school are a great source of information and can assist in establishing this lane.

1. **TASK:** Perform Stealthful and Unobserved Individual Movement.

2. **CONDITIONS:** All combat equipment, less rucksack, is carried. The soldier is provided 10 minutes to ensure he is soundproofed and camouflaged (see PCI lane on page C-1). He is given a clearly marked lane in which to move (approximately 100m wide by 200m long). Two to three "listening posts (LPs)" are positioned throughout or to the flanks of the first 100 meters of the lane. The soldiers who serve as the enemy LPs should have their backs to the lane (to prevent them from seeing the lane).

A marker will be emplaced to designate the last 100 meters at which time the soldier must move unobserved by an observation post to the endpoint which is clearly visible to the evaluated soldier. The final 100 meters will not be significantly restricted nor will they be marked, and will have one or two enemy observation posts positioned throughout the area. These OPFOR soldiers are to aggressively scan the area to locate the soldier negotiating the lane. The observation post is not occupied until the evaluated soldier identifies a route and begins movement. Once the soldier identifies his route, the evaluator notifies the OPFOR via FM to occupy the observation post and begin observation of the lane. The soldier may or may not be able to see the observation post. This exercise can be conducted during daylight or nighttime conditions.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** The soldier completes the first 100 meters of the lane without being compromised by the LPs and the final 100 meters without being observed by the observation post.

4. **TRAINING NOTES AND PROCEDURES:**

(A). This training puts a lot of pressure on the evaluator because he has to be as stealthful as the evaluated soldier. A technique is to provide the LPs with PRC 126/7s. When the LPs hear the evaluated soldier, they report the compromise to the lane OIC. The OIC could be located at the endpoint of the first 100 meters. The LP can describe over the radio exactly what he heard. The evaluated soldier links up with the lane OIC at the endpoint of the first 100 meters and begins the second phase of the lane. The observation post can call the lane OIC when he observes the evaluated soldier.

(B). The same type of lane can be used for squads and even platoons.

SQUAD/PLATOON MOVEMENT COMPETITION (I)

This training requires varying terrain and at least a one-kilometer by 500-meter lane. The competition trains squads and platoons on several tasks to include:

- ➤**Employment of movement techniques and formations**
- ➤**Use of hand-and-arm signals**
- ➤**Movement as a member of a fire team**
- ➤**Individual movement techniques**

1. **TASK:** Move Tactically.

2. **CONDITIONS:** The squad or platoon is tasked to initiate movement using the traveling movement technique. As the unit continues movement, the leader receives information via FM from the lane OIC/evaluator which generates a required change in movement techniques and formations. For example, the squad leader will be told that the enemy situation has changed and that "contact is possible," resulting in the movement technique changing from traveling to traveling overwatch. The cue to change movement formations would be derived from FM 7-8, p. 2-31 for a squad, and p. 2-37 for a platoon. To cue a change in a platoon formation, the OIC/evaluator would inform the platoon leader, "The enemy situation is vague, but contact is expected from the front." The proper response (as per FM 7-8) by the platoon would be to employ a platoon "Vee" formation. The squad or platoon leader is not allowed to issue verbal commands, requiring all information to be disseminated using hand-and-arm signals.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** The squad or platoon negotiates the entire lane employing the correct movement technique and formation as directed by the lane OIC/evaluator.

4. **TRAINING NOTES AND PROCEDURES:**

(A). This training requires extensive trainup, especially by the squad and platoon leaders who have to become intimately familiar with the standards for the movement techniques and formations outlined in FM 7-8 and ARTEP 7-8 MTP. Soldiers must know and practice hand-and-arm signals and must know distances to keep the proper intervals when movement techniques change (e.g., 20 meters to 50 meters when changing from traveling to traveling overwatch).

(B). The training requires at least two evaluators (the platoon leader and platoon sergeant or company commander and first sergeant). A scoring sheet is required. Scoring should be based on the number of "GOs" for each formation and technique. Additional points can be awarded if the leader, through terrain analysis, changes a movement formation correctly without being prompted by the OIC/evaluator.

SQUAD/PLATOON MOVEMENT COMPETITION (II)

This training pits squads or platoons against one another in a battle of patience, discipline, tactical knowledge, and some cunning. It requires about a square kilometer of varying terrain which is constrained by clearly identifiable control measures. Ideally, the terrain is enclosed by roads or trails which are out of bounds. The concept is simple: The squad or platoon which identifies the opposing unit first, without being compromised or violating any of the rules of engagement - - wins.

1. **TASK:** Locate Squad/Platoon-sized Element.

2. **CONDITIONS:** The units are given the area of operation, objectives on the far end of the lane and respective start points. The leader is provided 30 minutes to develop a plan to identify the other unit, and, at the same time, move to a designated objective on the far end of the lane. Notification that the opposing unit is identified must be made via FM communication to the OIC. Each unit has one observer/controller. All combat equipment, less rucksacks and NODs, is required. The training is conducted during daylight or nighttime conditions.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** Within two hours, the squad/platoon must reach their assigned objective and identify the opposing unit without compromise or violation of good tactical judgement or the rules of engagement.

4. **TRAINING NOTES AND PROCEDURES:**

(A). This exercise has the potential to be a "free for all" or just bad training, unless precise rules of engagement are established and sound tactical judgement is enforced. Otherwise, it is an opportunity for squad or platoon leaders to analyze terrain and command and control their units while engaging in honest competition.

(B). The time limit established in the task standards was a "best guess." It may be too much or not enough depending on the size of the training area. However, the important aspect is to get the units moving (tactically) while giving the leader the latitude to position observation/LPs or any other technique which is tactically feasible (the litmus test is: Would you do this in combat? The correct answer to the question would preclude leaders from sending all their soldiers out individually to find the opposing force). Given this, it should be a requirement for a leader (either team, squad, or platoon leader and or platoon sergeant) to observe and call in identification of the opposing force.

BANG DRILL

Sometimes the enemy is going to find you first. Although not the ideal situation, good drills can make the chance contact work in your favor. This is particularly true when the intent of the operation (as in a search and attack) is to ultimately kill the enemy. As defined in FM 7-8, a drill is "a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate planning process." Drills are a trained response to enemy actions or leaders orders. The "response" must be continually reinforced and trained. It is unreasonable to believe that rapidly executed responses can be inculcated in our soldiers with training every two or three months. The following "low cost" drills can be trained at anytime with or without resources, weapons, or equipment. These drills can be initiated anytime with either individual soldiers or as a squad or platoon. The standards for react to contact are clearly outlined in ARTEP 7-8 Drill. However, the purpose of the ***BANG DRILL*** is to execute the individual and collective intricacies of the drill in a nontactical environment. The associated standards that the leader expects must be clear to the soldier and unit and outlined in an SOP. The SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS will focus on those intricacies.

1. **TASK:** React to Contact.

2. **CONDITIONS:** The individual soldier, squad or platoon is in a garrison or field environment. The team, squad or platoon leader initiates the drill by announcing "BANG." The soldiers may or may not have individual equipment and weapon.

3. **TASK STANDARD:** The soldier executes his role in the battle drill and or the unit collectively executes the drill.

4. **SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS:**

(A). Immediately upon hearing "BANG," soldiers assume the prone position and simulate returning fire in the cardinal direction provided by the leader.

(B). The leader announces the desired rate of fire for the suppression, and the soldier does the following:

(1). For a ***sustained rate of fire,*** M249 and M60 gunners count four seconds between six to nine round bursts. For example, the soldier will announce the following: "BURST, one thousand one, one thousand two, one thousand three, one thousand four, BURST." The M16 rifleman counts four seconds between each round fired.

(2). For a ***rapid rate of fire,*** M249 and M60 gunners count two seconds between burst and the M16 rifleman counts one second between rounds fired.

(3). The M203 gunner announces, "One round 40-mm center sector."

(C). The leader instructs an individual soldier, "Your magazine is empty." The soldier announces "Changing magazines," and the soldier's buddy announces "Picking up the rate of fire."

(D). The leader announces to the unit, "The M60 is down." The M249 gunners announce, "Picking up the rate of fire."

(E). The leader announces to the unit, "The M60 gunner is dead." The assistant gunner announces, "Taking the gun." The leader announces to the unit, "The AG is down." The nearest rifleman announces, "Taking the gun." Every time the leader announces that "the M60 is down or the gunner dead," the other soldiers automatically pick up the rate of fire. The same actions should take place for the M249 and M203.

Appendix D
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